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Abstract
This thcsis will allemptto challenge the cogency or Plato's anti-poetry position by
dissolving the supposed opposition between philosophy and poetry. By surveying the
claims Socrates makes that dismiss poetry and privilege philosophy. we discover that
Socrates' antagonism stems I'rom a charge that poetry does not require any discernible
skill and is related to an irrational parl 01" the human psyche: conversely. philosophy is
superior because it requires a skill (dialectic) and is a strictly rational activity. Howcver.
this thcsis argues that this is an unl"aircharacterization 01" both philosophy and poctry.
Firstly. we explore how the dialogues themselvcs undermine Socrates' championing or
rationality and logos. This will take up the majority 01" the thesis. Secondly. we revaluate
poetry by turning to Viktor Shklovsky's characterization ol'poetry. which illuminates the
skill 01" poetry. Finally. we end by illustrating how philosophy and poetry arc congruous
insol"ar as they both I"orce the individual 10 consider new ways 01" thinking.
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I Conclusion Iml
This thesis will investigate the relationship betwcen Platonic philosophy and
poetry. There is a historical reading of Plato as being anti-litcrature. For examplc, in The
Binh o/Tragedy. ictzsche accuses Socrates of killing tragedy with his excessive
cmphasis on rcason and rationality: "Consider the consequcnccs of the Socratic maxims:
'Virtue is knowledge: man sins only from ignorance; he who is virtuous is happy.' In
thcsc three basic forms of optimism lies the death oftragcdy" (91). As well, in The Fire
({lid lhe SIlI1, Iris Murdoch goes lo grcatlengths to build a detCnce of art against Plato's
claims. In fact, there are numerous examples of Plato bcrating poets for lacking rcason.
Here are but a few:
Socrates: I decided that it was not wisdom that enabled them lo write their poetry.
but a kind of instinct or inspiration. such as you find in seers and prophets who
deliver all their sublime messages without knowing in the least what they mean. It
seemed clcar to me that the poets were in much the same case. and I also observed
that the very fact that they were poets made thelllthink that they had a pcrfcct
understanding of all other subjects. of which lhey were totally ignorant. (Apology
22c)
Socrates: And what is the aim of thal stately and marvellous creature. tragic
drama? Is it her cndeavour and ambition. in your opinion. merely to gratify the
spectators: or. if there be anything pleasant and charming. but evil. to struggle
against uttering it. but to declaim and sing anything that is unwelcome but
beneficial. whether they like it or not? For which of these two aims do you think
tragic poetry is equipped?
Callicles: It is quite evident. Socrates, that her impulse is rather toward pleasure
and the gratification of the spectators. (Corgia,\' S02b-c)
Athenian: 'Tis an old story. legislator, whieh we poets are always telling with the
universal approval of the rest of the world, that when a poet takes his seat on the
Muse's tripod. hisiudgmenttakes leave or him, Ilc is like a fountain which gives
free course to the rush of its waters. and since representation is of the essence of
his art, must orten contradict his own utterances in his presentations of contrasted
characters. without knowing whether the truth is on the side of this speaker or
thaI. (La\l'.I'719c)
Athenian: ow what principle. we may ask. did that statement illustrate') Was not
the implication that pocts arc not quite the most competent judges of good and
evil') Hence a poet who goes wrong in language or melody on this point - lhat of
praying for the wrong thing - will of course lead our citizens to transgress our
rcgulations in thcir prayers for lhings of supreme momcnt, though, as we just said.
il would be hard to find a more serious error. Shall we then add anolher typical
regulation about music to this elTect')
C1inias: But to what effect? We should be glad of a clearer stalement.
Athenian: No poet shall compose anything in contravention of the public
standards of law and right, honor and good, nor shall he be at libel1y to display
any composition to any private citizen whatsoever ulllil he has first submitted it to
the appointed censors of such malleI'S and the curators of law. and obtained their
approval. These censors we have to all intents appointed by our election of
legislations for music and superintendent of education. (Laws 80 Ib-d)
From these excerpts we can observe a general trend: poetry lacks a definable skill. and
must be curtailed because it stimulates a part of the psyche that is irrational. which can be
detrimental to citizens. These two criticisms of poetry arc specifically explored in fOil and
Repllblic. In fOil. Socrates claims that poets have no leefllle l and arc merely inspired by
the Muses. and concludes that poets have no real knowledge. And in Repllhlic. Socrates
goes so far as to ban various forms of poetry from the Kallipolis for being dangerous for
the moral education of the populous.
Socrates' problem with poetry is epistemic. moral. and metaphysical. As
explained in Til/wellS. the material world is an imitation of the intelligible world of the
Good/Forms. It is the job of the dialectic to break us from our opinions and beliefs
informed by our sensual perceptions and proceed towards the intelligible forms and
knowledge. as Socratcs explains in Repllblic using the Line and Cave analogies, Since
poetry is mimetic, according to Socrates. it therefore represents a representation and is
thus two steps away from reality. Socrates concludes that philosophy is superior because
it employs a leelllie (the dialectic) and is able to impart real knowledge (the Forms\
Ilowever. this is not necessarily the case. For one thing. many of Plato's dialogues end in
aporia. which is to say there is no satisfactory conclusion. Despite their rigorous
application of the dialectic, Socrates and his interlocutors rarely achieve an incontestable
definition of whatever virtue they are discussing. Laches' inability to define courage and
Thealellls' to define knowledge are two examples of aporelic dialogues that show the
problem of definition. Drawing also from the Sel'enlh Lel/er, we conclude that the Forms
arc non-discursive, and trying to discuss them is not as straightforward as Socrates seems
to suggest.
However. P/llIedrllS and Srlllposillill show us ways to discuss the Forms despite
their non-discursiveness. P/Illedm.\· is of particular interest because it both problematizes
many of Socrates' arguments in lOll and Repllblic and sheds some light on the way in
which the dialogues arc written. Firstly. in P/llIedms, Socrates actually praises
irrationality and argues for its role in contributing to knowledge. vis-ii-vis ems and the
process of recollection. Secondly, we get a critique 01' writing. as Socrates illustrates its
inability to directly convey the ideas of the author. Referring to the SeCIJlld Lel/er. we see
how Plato lakes Socrates' points into consideration and is able to take the risk of writing
~ Th~ rdationship h~tw~~n knowkdg~ and th~ Forms will h~ dis~lIss~d in d~l"il l"l~r in Chapl~r I
by using the form of the dialogue, as opposed to that of a treatise or essay. Accordingly.
SYlllposiulII provides us with a sort of case study to observe how Plato writes philosophy.
All the false starts and dead ends of the various interlocutors culminate in Diotima's
speech, which demonstrates the non-discursive Ie/os of the dialectic by further building
on Phaedrus' points about eros and recollection.
Platonic dialogues must therefore be approached holistically in oreler to see the
forest lor the trces. Once Socrates' arguments arc understood within the rull rrame of the
dialogue it becomes evident that it is not so much the arguments themselves that Plato is
trying make explicit but rather the method of argumentation. The goal of the dialogues is
to question the nature of knowledge itself and to challenge the notion that we indeed have
rull knowledge of concepts such as justice. beauty. courage. etc. Each dialogue follows a
progression in which the speakers rirst ideillify a concept as their subject of discussion.
Diffcrent speakers otTer various definitions that Socrates then in turn picks apan and
disproves. Plato thus illustrates that concepts cannot he understood with words only. The
true nature of a conecpt exists within the ideal realm of the Forms. which can only be
shared intuitively. This is the Platonic dialectic. It brings language to its breaking point
and shows us that our understanding or concepts can never be taken 1'01' granted.
Likewise. poetry is also capable of disarming our notions of fixity in language by
virtue of the defamillarizing erfect or poetic language. Viktor Shklovsky asserts lhat lhe
technique of poetry is to break our habitual experience or objects by rendering lhem
unfamiliar. Poetry uses language that is metaphoric and dinicult, which challenges the
reader. The reader is thus forced to reconsider the object. This method is similar to
Socrates' elellclic method as seen in MellO, wherein Meno compares Socrates to a
stingray who "numbs" his audience. Thus. according to Shklovsky. poetic language
defamiliarizes our perception of language and in turn challenges our notions of fixity in
meaning and being. Socrates' ontological criticism ofpoctry as a rcprcsentation ofa
representation is therefore incomplete because poetry is not only mimetic. Whether or not
poetry is just a copy of a copy does not matter because the purpose of arl is not merely to
represent nature. but as Shklovsky states. to defamiliarize. Defamiliarization is thus
poetry's leclllle. In a sense one can engage in dialectic with a work of art. A work can
defamiliarize and challenge a reader. In turn, as the reader interprets the text. s/he begins
to come up with dilTcrent answers and responses. which can then be challenged again.
Poetry is therefore analogous to Plato's dialectic in that it breaks the reader from his/her
habitual experience and forces him/her to reconsider various ideas. Art can thus
contribute to the Platonic project of deeonstrueting preconceived notions of truth and lead
the thinker towards the Forms/the Good. The "ancient quarrel" between poelry and art
that Socrates alludes to at 697b is thus a misnomer and the effect produced via the
experience of arl is in faet congruous with the Platonic dialectic 3
This thesis will seek to dissolve the supposed quarrel between philosophy and
poetry. We will sec that a quarrel only exists insofar as philosophy and poetry arc
unjustly characterized. The majority of this thesis will be dedicated to a more just and
consequently less quarrelsome characterization. More specifically, we will deconstruct
the notion that philosophy is about derining concepts and Forms by reducing them to
/ogoi. 4 Rather, as is our contention, Plato sees philosophy as searching for the mcthod(s)
or way(s) of thinking about and/or understating the Forms or philosophical notions. Once
this has been established, we will have opened a space for poetry to come onto the scene.
Poetry. this thesis will argue. is about representing a subject such that the reader is forccd
to reconsider his/her ideas about it. Therefore, if there is a quarrel between philosophy
and poetry, it is a sibling rivalry.
The first chapter will explore the various claims thai Socrates makes about poctry
in 101/ and Repllh/ic. We will also draw on Til/wells to supplemcnt the metaphysical
considerations of Repllhlic. Ultimately. wc will draw out the epistemic. moral. and
mctaphysieal critiques that Socrates launches against poctry. After thcse cxpository
sections. we take a more critical approach to Socrates' claims about philosophy. and turn
towards the Seventh Leller to help make sense of the inconsistencies and contradictions
that arc inherent in Repllblic, concluding that the Forms are non-discursive and cannot be
reduced to a logos. The first chapter concludes with a sort of aporia; if the Forms are
non-discursive and dialectic is discursive then how do we arrive at any conclusions'! How
do we do philosophy'!
Accordingly, chapter two will attempt to resolve this issue by analyzing Plliledms
and SWI/posilll/I. In the section on Plliledrus, we introduce the concept of eros, and the
way irrationality can contribute to philosophical considerations. We then go into greater
detail on Phaedms' discussion of writing and how it provides insight into Plato's writing.
drawing also on the Secol/d Letter. What we discern is that Plato is able to do philosophy
in light of non-discursiveness. We then move into the S\,II//)()silll/I. Our analysis of
S\'IIlposi/1/1/ is twofold. At once, it completes the discussion of eros and its contribution to
knowledge and philosophy. Secondly. it provides a case study for the points made in
Plliledms about writing.
In chapter three. we return to poetry with Shklovsky's essay "Art as Tcchniquc"
Wc cxplore Shklovsky's concepts ofalgebrization and dcl'amiliarization. Shklovsky givcs
us a conception of poetry that is not merely mimctic. We then move onto Me/III to
explore the ways in which defamiliarization and dialectic arc congruous. We conclude
that philosophy and poetry do similar work insofar as they force the individual to
consider new ways of thinking.
1.1 Introduction
The lirst three sections of this chapter. "Poetry in 1011", 'Poetry and Morality in
Republic", and "Metaphysics and Poetry", will survey the key criticisms that Socrates
makes against poetry. In lOll and Republic, we see Socrates' most hostile remarks about
poetry. In lOll, Socrates argues that poetry cannot be considered a teelllle because it is a
product of emotion and inspiration, not of knowledge. Thcn, in Republic, Socrates dctails
his issues regarding the form and content of poetry, and why poetry musl be strictly
censored irit is to have a place in the Kallipolis. Ilowever, Socrates' strongcst argumcnt
against poetry stems from his metaphysical conviction that poetry is essentially mimetic,
and is thus twice removed from reality. i.e. the Forms. Taken together we conclude that
Socrates is opposed to poetry becausc it is not a tee/lIIe, and is therefore lacking a logos,
and lhat it cannot represent any lype or knowledge as it is so far removed from the Forms.
Likewise, philosophy is superior because it can provide a logos, and can direct the
individual towards considering the Forms.
Ilowcver. the linal section of this chapter, ,/\ New /\pproach to Plato", reveals
that a closer reading or the dialogues betrays Socrates' conlidence in philosophy's
supposed ability to provide a logos. We see this manifested in thc dissatisfaction of
Socrates' interlocutors and the unsatisractory conclusions or the ({poretic dialogues. Thc
problem, as the Sel'ellth Leller cxplains, is language. Language is incapablc of
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representing the Forms. As a result, knowledge of the Forms is non-discursive. By non-
discursive, we mean knowledge that cannot be expressed in propositions and must be
achieved obliquely, either through figurative language, implication, etc. Conversely. by
discursive, we mean knowledge that can be expressed in propositions or syllogisms. The
issue is that the Forms cannot be expressed with discursive language: they cannot be
reduced to a set of predicates. Discursive language is divided whereas the Forms arc
undivided. Therefore we must use language in a non-discursive fashion that gestures
towards the Forms. This is signilicant because it challenges Socrates' points about the
goals of philosophy, and why it is supposedly superior to poetry.
1.2 Poetry in 101/.
It is no surprise that readers label Plato as anti-literature. In lOll. Socrates goes so
far as to say poetry is not even a lee/IIII'. Tee/IIII', according to Socrates. belongs 10 the
realm of knowledge. whereas poetry is a product 0" emotion and divination. The
physician has his/her lee/IIII'. cven the sculptor. in the sense that they seem to know how
to bring about an intended effect using various tcchniqucs. but not thc poct. Whenever
Plato writcs about poctry hc uscs thc nouns epiplloi((\ or lIIilllesi/'. but never {ee/llle.
Socratcs has two principlc argumcnts 10 prove his point that poetry is nol a {ec!llle. His
first argumcnt is that thc "Iee/llle" ofthc poct is derivcd from inspiration. not from
knowledge or technique. Socratcs treals poetry as a matter of mania or elll!leos. mcaning
... ··l1rcathingupoll.·or··inspiration..
""Imitation"
II
"full of god," inspired, or possessed (Rijksbaron 9). Socrates compares Ion and the pocts
to Euripides' "stone of Heraclea," a powerful magnet (533d)7 The magnet works to
attract a long chain of iron rings. The loadstone, the original magnetic forcc. imparts its
magnctism unto each iron ring, which then in turn altracts another ring, forming achain,
each mimicking the other. Socrates compares this loadstone to the Muse. "She lirst
makes men inspired," explains Socrates. "and then through these inspircd ones others
sharc in the enthusiasm, and a chain is formed, for the cpic poets. all the good oncs, havc
their excellence, not from art, but are inspired, possessed, and thus they ulterallthese
admirable poems" (534a).x Poets therefore do not have a leelll/e, "for a poet is a light and
winged thing, and holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired. and is
beside himselL and reason is no longer in him" (534b). Consequently, Socratcs reasons.
these are not the words of the poet, but of the Gods who speak through the poets. using
them as "ministers" (534d). Finally. the last ring is the audience. The loadstone is the
Muse or God. the first ring is the poel, the second is the rhapsodc. and the last is the
spcctator listcning to the rhapsode's or actor's pcrformance (536a). Socrates characterizes
this movcmcnt as a form of possession. The pact, rhapsode. and audience are all
possessed by the God or Muse (536b).
In ReplIiJlic. it becomes evident why Socrates is wary of such a relationship.
7 1t is ironic that Socrates should dismiss pOdry and Ih~11 illlllledialelyrefcrloa pocticcxalllpk to prove his
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Socrates asks:
And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to
exact an account of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that
lhe one who is unable to do this. in so far as he incapable 01' rendering an
account to himself and olhers. does nOl possess full reason and intelligence
about the mailer? [... j And is not this true of the good likewise -thalthe
man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract
from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot. as it
were in bailie, running the gauntlet of all tests, and striving to examine
everything by essential reality and not by opinion. hold on his way
through all this without tripping in his reasoning - the man who lacks this
power. you will say. does not really know the good itself or any panicular
good. but if he apprehends any adumbration of it. his contact with it is by
opinion, not by knowledge and dreaming and dozing through his present
life. before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall
asleep forever? (53-1b-d)
Socrates insists that in order for something to be considered knowledge. it must be
accompanied by a logo.\'. The purpose of philosophy. so says Socrates. is to achieve
knowledge rationally and discursively. Socrates is not dismissing the Gods or Muses in
lOll. but he seems to be suggesting that this method of knowledge. divine dispensation.
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needs to be transcended or overcome. that there needs to be a better method to arrive at
truth. The philosopher is not satisfied with mere imagery: a philosophical justification
will have its basis in the universalizing quality of rationality (Dorter 32). In the Theme/I/s.
Socrates tells Theatetus. "Just as you found a single character to embrace all that
multitude, so now try to find a single formula that applies to the many kinds of
knowledge" (J 48d). The challenge of the Theli/e/lis is to explain the logos that makes
opinions knowledge. Socrates will assist Theatetus by using his skill as a "midwifc": ·the
highest point of my art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a
young man's thought is a false phantom or instinct with lilc and truth" (150e). Socrates'
/eclllle is his method of testing an interlocutor's hypothesis to sec whether it is capable of
providing the logos whereby the opinion could be knowledge. And according to fIJI/.
poetry cannot give us thal.')
Socrates' second argument is that there arc no judges of poetry. Socrates raises
the issue of expertise and explains how a physician is able to judge who is the most
knowledgeable out of a group of speakers discussing medicine because that physician
understands health and the technique of medicine. Conversely. while many poets speak
differently on similar subject matters. Ion is unable Lo judge who speaks the best: he can
only comment on Homer (532). Socratcs thus concludes. "it is plain to everyone that not
from art and knowlcdge comcs your power to speak concerning Homer. If it were art that
1-1-
gave you power. then you could speak about all the othcr pocts as well" (532c).11l One is
tempted to dismiss Socrates' criticism here as more of a chargc against rhapsodes and not
against poets. but Socrates thcn goes on to criticize pocts for bcing unable to distinguish
their "art" li'om others. and for speaking on subjects on which they possess no expertise
(537-8). Socratcs lists a number of different techniques that Homer describes such as
charioteering, fishing, and warfare, yet the poet/rhapsode is an authority on none of these
(538-40).11 In Republic, Socrates states:
Yet still he will nonetheless imitate, though in every case he docs not
know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems. the thing he
will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant
multitude 1... 1 On this, then, as it seems. we are fairly well agreed. that the
imitator knows nothing wOl1h mentioning of the things he imitates. but
that imitation is a form of play. not to be taken seriously. and that those
who attempt tragic poetry. whether in iambic or heroic verse. arc all
together imitators. (602b)
Socrates' goal here is to show that making poems is not evidence of any sort of
knowledge or ability, and that poets write whatever they like on any subject they like
without having to be held accountable for whatlhey write (Rijksbaron 10-1 I). Therefore.
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there is no technique for the poet like medicine is for the doctor, but when Socrates docs
make reference to something like a poetic technique he uses the noun "mimesis"
(Rijksbaron 9). This is why Socrates refers to Ion and the rhapsodes as "interpreters of
interpreters" (535). If the above is correct, as Rijksbaron asserts. 1011 is a partofPlato's
program or agenda to show that poetry, being mimetic of the imperfect, material world.
should be rejected and not be allowed in the state (Rijksbaron 13).
1.3 Poetry and Morality in Republic
In Repuhlic, we see Socrates take an even more antagonistic stance towards
poetry, expanding on his notion of poetry as mimetic, and why it should be curtailed
within the well-governed state. Here, we see Socrates' moral critique of poetry insofar as
censoring poetry will ensure a more lawful state. Essentially, since poetry is mimetic,
Socrates fears that audiences will be inspired to imitate wrongful behaviour. Socrates
declares:
We will beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry it' we cancel those
and all similar passages, not that they are not poetic and pleasing to most
hearers, but because the more poetic they are the less they arc suited to the
earsofboysandmenl···1(387b)
To illustrate his issue with poetry and why its presence in the Kallipolis must be
curtailed, Socrates details his problems with both the content and form of poetry.
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In regards to content, we see all the emendations that Socrates makes to Hesiod
and Homer. In Book Two, Socrates begins discussing how the guardians will be
educated. First they will begin with "ralse" stories. By that he means poetic tales orthc
gods and heroes (376c-377a). However:
We must begin. then, it seems. by a censorship over our story-makcrs. and
what they do well we must pass and what not. rcjcct. And the stories on
the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers lo tell to the childrcn
and so shape thcir souls by these stories far rathcr than their bodies by
their hands. But most of the stories they now tcll we must rcject. (]77c)
The myths will be manipulated to foster in children the four virtues: wisdom. courage.
self-control. and justicc (Dortcr 75). Some of Socrates' suggestions ought to raise an
eyebrow for many contcmporary readers: such as making ..taboo in thcse mattcrs thc
entire vocabulary orten'or and lear" because they want guardians that do not tear death.
especially in battle (386c): or his urge to omit the passagc in 711e lIilld where Achilles
lamcnts the death or Patroclus because such emotions arc ""unworthy" (388a-d).'2
Socratcs' point is that there are the types of behaviour that thc Guardians must not
imitate.
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Socrates's criticism of poetry reflects his metaphysics. Spccifically, it speaks to
his privileging of unity ovcr multiplicity. In 393a, Socratcs distinguishes between
imitation and narration. To explain the former. Socrates refers to the passage in the Iliad
in which Chryses implores Agamemnon to release Briseis. According to Socrates. Homer
delivers the lines"as ifhe were himselfChrysesand tries as farasmaybeto make us feel
that not Homer is the speaker. but the priest. an old man" (393b). Therclore. if the writer
is writing through the perspective ofa character. s/he is imitating. Conversely. "if the
poet should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetizing and narration would have
been accomplished without imitation" (393d). Socrates explains. ··there is one kind of
poetry and taletelling which works wholly through imitation. as you remarked. tragedy
and comedy. and another which cmploys the recital of the poet himself, best exemplified.
1presume. in the dithyramb. and there is again that which employs both. in epic poetry"
(394c). Socrates must then decide what kind of poet he will allow in the Kallipolis. It is
important to note that Socrates is - rath r dogmatically - claiming that an individual
cannot "imitate many things well as he can one" (394e). For instance. he claims that a
poet cannot succeed in both tragedy and comedy. 13 Nonetheless. Socrates sticks to his
assertion and argues that the guardians cannot be allowed to mimic anything that is not
conducive to becoming "expert craftsmen of civic liberty" (397c).I-l But. if they were to
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imitate. they must imitate what is proper. and this is where we see all the edits,
amendments, and censorship of literature that Socrates champions. For example. Socrates
suggests that Hesiod's account or Ouranos' castration at the hands of his son, Kronos.
should not be taught to the youth. and should be either censored or shown only to a select
few readers (377e-378a).
Socrates then observes that there is a virtuous form of diction and an unvirtuous
rorm or diction. He asserts that a good man will identiry with a virtuous character and
have no trouble in mimicking such an individual, whereas he would not be willing to
mimic an unvirtuous character (396c). Accordingly. ""the narrative that he will employ
will be of the kind that we just now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction
will be one that partakes of both. of imitation and simple narration, but there will be a
small portion of imitation in a long discourse" (396e). Socrates is thus willing to concede
a certain degree of mimicry, but it must be in keeping with virtuous behaviour and
character. 15 We can see that Socrateshasa very paternalistic attitudelOwardsthe
Guardians: they are childish in the sense that they must becarel"ully monitored lestlhey
arc exposed to something that may jeopardize their development. Likewise. as Socrates
sees imitation as a form of play (602b), he allows the Guardians to engage in it
somewhat. as long as it is appropriate play. Furthermore. this does little to soften Plato's
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reputation as anti-poetry, for poetry is still treated as mimesis, which according to
Socrates is merely play.
1.4 leta physics and Poetry
We now shift towards the metaphysical critique 01' poetry. Predominately.
Socratcs has two principle ontological problems with poctry: firstly. Socrates dismisses
types of poetry that havc a multitude of voices: he prefers a singular authoritative voice.
Secondly, and more importantly, since poetry is an imitation of the sensual world. it is
twice removed from the Forms.
In regards to the fonner. Socrates makes the point of distinguishing narration as
unmixed whereas imitation is mixed. arration "involvelsl slight variations. and if we
assign a suitable pitch and rhythm to the diction 1... 1 the right spcaker speaks almost on
the same note and in one cadence 1... 1and similarly in a rhythm ofneariy the same kind"
(397c). Conversely. imitation requires "every kind of pitch and all rhythms. irit too is to
have appropriate expression. since it involves manifold forms or variation" (397c). Thus.
the "unmixed imitator orthe good" is permilled acecss to the Kallipolis. This is echoed in
Socratcs' discussion or grace and gracelessness. which statcs. "gracelessness and evil
rhythm and disharmony arc akin to evil speaking and the evil temper. but the opposites
arc the symbols and the kin orthe opposites. the sober and good disposition" (·Hlla).
Socrates is clearly adamant about harmony and unity. And for this reason. Socrates
affirms that not only poetry but also all forms of an must be censured in order to ensure
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that none portrays discordant forms. Yet the narration itself is told as a recollection from
the point of view 0" Socrates, so the story is literally a multitude of voices contained in
Likewise. Socrates asserts. "edueation in music is most sovereign'-' (40Ie) lor
harmony and rhythm are most plainly expressed therein. Plato then draws a strong
connection between harmony and virtue. Socrates states:
am Inot right in saying that by the same token we shall never be true
musicians I... 'I until we are able to recognize the lorms of soberness.
courage. liberality. and high-mindedness. and all their kindred and their
opposites. too. in all the combinations that contain and convey them. and
to apprehend them and their images wherever found. disregarding them
neither in trilles nor in grealthings. but believing the knowledge of them
to belong to the same art and discipline. (..Hl2c)
The knowledge of harmony and rhythm clearly extends beyond just musical theory.
According to Socrates. harmony. rhythm. and the virtues arc all manifestations of the
Good. Socrates explains... the man whose mind is truly lixed on clernal realities 1 ... 1
I'ixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order. and seeing that they
1... 1 all abide in harmony as reason bids. he will endeavor to imitate them and. as far as
may be. to fashion himselfinlheir likeness and assimilate himself to them" (SOOc). l3y
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ccnsuring art the way hc does, Socrates is thus trying to maximize any potential for
inculcating the Good. 16
Socratcs' discussion of harmony over dissonance andunmixcd over mixed
illustrates a rejection of multiplicity for unity. We see this in his metaphysics. which
states lhat the sensible (the physical) is an imperfect imitation of the ideal (the rational).
We can see Socrates' privileging unity over multiplicity most explicitly in Tillwell.l'.
I-Icrein, Timacus posits illlclligibilily first, which the Demiurge then imposes on
disorderly mallcr. Tilllaeus begins by drawing a distinction between the ideal world.
which is fixed and unchanging, and the physical world. which is in a constant state of
becoming. Tilllaeus asserts that the world was "Created 1... 1 being visible and tangible
and having a body, and therefore sensible. and all sensible things are apprehended by
opinion and sense. and are in a process of creation and created" (28b-e). Accordingly.
"everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be crcated by somc cause. filr
without a cause nothing can be created" (28a). The physical world. according to Tilllaeus.
is a copy of the original. perfect world. Timaeus explains how. "God desired that all
things should be good and nothing bad r... 1 Wherefore also linding the whole \"isible
sphere not at res!. but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion. oul of disorder he
brought order. considering that this was in every way beller than the other" (30a). The
Demiurge used the ideal world of forms as the template to fashion the physical world as a
copy. There is some ambiguity here as to whether there was already a physical world that
the Demiurge fashions, or whether the Demiurge both created and shaped the physical
world. Aristotle believes the latter, but most assert the former (Taylor 442-3). Gilles
Deleuze asserts. "The important point is that the divisible is deli ned as that which bears
in itself the unequal, where as the indivisible (the Same or the One) seeks to impose an
equality upon it. and thereby render it docile" (233). Thus we can surmise that. on the one
hand, there is the Demiurge and the forms, and, on the other, a chaotic world of matter.
Whether God created matter, or whether matter already existed and the Demiurge comes
on the scene to "render it docile" is a matter of interpretation.
The Demiurge. filling the world with various beings to complete the universe's
unity. creates the stars. which. according to Timaeus. are minor Gods. To these he
delegates the responsibility of creating the rest of the animals. including man. The
Demiurge commands the Gods:
Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created - without them the
universe will be incomplete. or it will not contain every kind of animal
which it ought to contain. il' it is to be perfect. On the other hand. if they
were created by me and received life at my hands. they would be on an
equality with the gods. In order then that they may be mortal. and that this
universe may be truly universal. do yeo according to your natures. betake
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yourselves to the formation of animals, imitating the power which was
shown by me in creating you. (4Ic)
Man is thus a mix of immortality and mortality. They are created in the form of the
Demiurge and the Gods. but because they were not actually created by the Demiurge
himself. man is subpar to the Gods. Why the Demiurge needed Man. or any of the other
animals, Timaeus is not entirely specific; he simply states that the Demiurgeneedsall
these creatures in order that universe be complete. Timaeusasserts. ··the creation of the
world is the combined work of necessity and mind. Mind. thc ruling power. persuaded
necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection. and thus and after this
manner in the beginning. through necessity made subject to reason. this universe was
created" (-l7e-48a). Why Timaeus personifies mind and necessity is difficult to say. but it
appears that the Demiurge fashioned matter according to the necessity of form's reason.
fhat said. "il"a person will truly tell ol"the way in which the work was accomplished. he
must include the variableeauseas well. and explain itsinlluence"(-l8a).This··\'ariable
cause" is the third principle in the Til1laell.I'· triadic ontology. Timaeus defines it as .. the
receptacle. and in a manner. the nurse ol"all generation" (-l9b). The system is as f{lilows:
"'irs!. that whieh is in process 01" generation: secondly. that in which the generation takes
place: and thirdly. that of which the thing generated is a resemblance naturally produced.
And we may liken the receiving principle to a mother. and the source or spring to a
'~Ither. and the intermediate nature to a child" (SOd). The receptacle is composed of the
four clements: earth. water. wind. and fire. The elements never present themselves in the
same lorm and thus cannot be labeled demonstratively as ··this" or ··that.·· but only "as
such'" This receptacle is matter and is formless (50a). The four elements of the
receptacle (mother) were disorderly and the Demiurge (father) imposed form and
measure to the best of his ability and created the universe (the child). But, because the
elements were nOI perfect like the forms. the child is a deformed and derivative copy of
the father (52b-c). God creates order out of chaos, but given the nature of the chaolic
elements. order cannot fully beaehieved. Deleuzeexplains the Demiurge's process in a
mocking tone:
He has equalized the divisible in this extension which is the extension of
the Soul of the world. but underneath, at the deepest layer of the divisible.
the unequal still rumbles in intensity. This is of little consequence to God.
for he fills the entire expanse of the soul with extensity of bodies and their
qualities. He covers everything. evertheless. he dances upon a volcano.
Never have so many. so diverse and such demented operations been
multiplied in order 10 draw from the depths of an intensive sfJ{{lilllll a
serene and docile extensity, and to dispel a Difference which subsists in
itself even when it is cancelled oUlside itseIL(233--I)
Tillwells performs numerous operations trying to tame the wild formlessness of the
Mother: however, it remains nonetheless. Of course. this is not even Socrates speaking-
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it is Timaeus, a Pythagorean - so it is doubly difficult to ascertain how much Plato
agrees.
onetheless. the relationship between the ideal and the physical in the Tillwells is
congruous with Socrates' metaphysical points in l?eplliJlic. In Book Ten of l?epl/IJlic.
Socrates describes how art is in fact twice removed from reality as it is copying copies
and thus cannot offer any substantial knowledge. This charge stems from Plato's
metaphysics, which states that universals exist within an ideological realm of Forms that
can only be experienced rationally. The objects we perceive within the cxtended. physical
world are only imitations or representations of the forms. Since. as Socrates explains.
poetry is composed by representing the objects of the physical world. the poet is therdore
"in his nature three removes from the king and the truth" (597e). Socrates thus concludes
that all representation. or mimesis. "produces a product that is lar remo\'ed from truth
1... 1 and associates with the part in us lhat is remote from intelligence. and is its
companion and friend lor no sound and true purpose" (603b). The latter charge recalls
Socrates' point in lOll. but the former. more metaphysical criticism is unique to NefJl/h/ic
and represents Socrates/Plato's most systematic attack against poetry.
1.5 A New Appmach to Plato
While at this point il may seem that Platonic philosophy is irrevocably anti-
poetry. the reader must first recognize that Socrates has an open mind about the
construction of the Kallipolis and is willing to entertain the possibility of the study of
literature. Socrates states that he would allow "advocates who arc not poets but lovers 01"
poetry to plead her cause in prose without meter, and show that she is not only delightl"ul
but beneticial to orderly government and all the lite 01" man" (607d). Secondly. one must
be careful not to assume that the Kallipolis is actually Plato's ideal city as is historically
suggested. In Book Eight of Republic, Socrates in I"act describes how the Kallipolis will
ultimately deteriorate. lie states. "liard in truth it is lor a state thus constituted to he
shaken and disturbed, but since I"or everything that has come into being destruction is
appointed, not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time. but it shall surely be
dissolved" (546a). Therefore. considering these two points. it is clear that Plato's
rejection of literature is not carved in stone and there is potentiall"or some flexibility. In
this section we will consider passages 01" Republic and the Sel'eill/i Leller that destabilize
Socrates' literal claims about philosophy and poetry, We conclude that the rorms arc
non-discursive. which throws Socrates' supposed project ol"delinition and knowledge
into limbo.
So. il'the Kallipolis is unsustainable then what is the point of Socrates going
through the trouble 01" building it from the ground up only to tear it down') We should
remember. at this point. that Plato's primary goal in Repuhlic is not a depiction 01" the
ideal state. but to answer the question. "What isjustieeT Socrates reasons that il"they
could construct the perl"ect city then they would be able to observe justice in its purest
form and thus derive a satisfactory definition I"rom it:
But now let us work out the inquiry in which we supposed that. if we
found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there. we
should more easily discover its nature in the individual man. And we
agreed that this larger thing is the city. and so we constructed the best city
in our power. well knowing that in the good city it would of course be
found. What. then, we thought we saw lhere must refer back to the
individualand.ifitisconlirmed.allwillbewellr ... IThenajustmantoo
will not differ at all from ajust city in respect of the very form ofjuslice.
but will be like it. ('+34e-435b)
onetheless. RepltlJ/ic finishes in uporiu without a hard and fast definition ofjustice. At
'+33b. Socrates claims. "This. then. I said. my friend. if taken in a certain sense appears to
be justice. this principle or doing one's own business:' This or course begs the question.
howdo we establish whelherone's business is indeedjustilied'7 From.+29to.+33.
Socrates discusses how the lower forms of nature (sensual. spirited) must be reined in by
the higher (the rational). which is then applied to the state to suggest that the hoi polloi
and the Guardians must be governed by lhe Philosopher Kings. But who watches the
watchmen') i\ definition ofjustice as "doingone's business" is hardly capablc of
handling the complex problems oflhe state. Ifone were lodcfine bcing a ruler as keeping
the state in peace and order then one can useall sorts of unjust means(polieybrutalily.
surveillance. ele.) to justify the end. To determine whether the Philosopher Kings are
doing their job properly would require an appeal 10 the concept ofjust icc. but if the
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concept is understood as "doing one's business" then the argument becomes circular.
However, Socrates states. "A pattern [...1was what we wanted when we were inquiring
into the nature of ideal justice and asking what would be the character or the perfectly
just man 1... 1 We wished to rix our eyes upon them as types and models 1... 1 Our purpose
was not to demonstrate the possibility orthe realization of these ideals" (472e). Socrates'
goal was to rashion an image 01' the ideal state so that they may behold justice in action:
achieving a hard and rast definition ofjustice was never really an option for him. And
this is all part ofPlato's dialectical method.
In theSel'elllh Leller Plato states:
For everything that exists there are three classes or objects though which
knowledge about it must come: the knowledge itselr is a rourth. and we
must put as a rirth entity the actual object or knowledge which is the true
reality. We have then. rirst. a name. second. a description. third. an image.
and rourth. a knowledge or the object. (3-i2b)
The dialectic thus begins with a term. In the case or ReplI!JIic. it is justice. The rirst class
here is the linguistic unit !justicel. The next class is to provide a description composed or
nouns and verbs. which is where Repllblic immediately runs into trouble. In the SC'I'elllh
Leller. Plato uscs the more straightrorward example or a circle (]-i2e).17 The third class is
17Socrate:-./Platois !"onuofusinggeometriccxalllpksasalllodd for trying to 1I1llkrstand the Illoredirricult
forms
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an image. An image of a circlc is clcar cnough. but justice is another matter. Because
they are unable to satisfy the second class in Repllblic, Socrates tries moving onto the
third class so they may come back to it, which is the purpose of the Kallipolis: to provide
an image of the just state so that they may observe justice and come to define it. Whether
or not the interlocutors or the reader come to know justice by the end of Repllhlic is a
matter of inlerpretation and debate.
The majority of the Platonic dialogues are unable to satisfy this second class.
Eventually it becomcs evident that an incontestable definition is impossible. and this is
known as the elel/cltlls. which is given particular prominence in the MellO. Elene/ills in
Ancient Greek can be translated as "shame." ··disgraee." or "reproach." The elenclllIs
docs not lead to better definitions: it leads to untraversable impasses. Dialogues end in
lIl}()rili. which can mean puzzlement. or "being at a loss" - hence. the majority or Plato's
carly dialogues arc reICrred to as "lIporelic.'· However. while the elenchlls may incur
discouragement. it can also produce bewilderment and wonder. Wonder because the first
step towards true knowledge is when one realizes the falsity of his/her opinions and is
moved to consider something better (Dorter II). This is significant because. as this thesis
will show. the Forms arc non-discursive. one cannot restrict oneself to a particular
understanding ofa certain concept. The dialectic, we argue. is about constantly
introducing new ways to consider a concept. always improving upon one's
understanding.
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The dialectic thus follows a sequenee very much like the Cavc and Linc
analogies. The philosophical dialcctic breaks down language and Icads the thinker up the
Line until he can grasp the Form rationally. Thc individual begins with a name. which is
only a representation of the Form. and then sthe progresses through the dialectic until
sthe exits the Cave to come upon the Form as it is represented by the Sun. However.
when one returns to the Cave it is impossible to describe the Form in words; the other
prisoners think the speaker has gone mad. The prisoners must too be brought up from the
Cave to"see" the Form.
The Divided Line. as Socrates explains in Book Six of Repllhlic. represents the
four modes of thinking. It is first partitioned into two segments: the upper representing
the intelligent realm and the lower the sensible realm. Each partition is bisected again
into perception of the image of an object and perception of the object itself. There is thus
a fourfold classification: ei/':{/si{/. which means picture-thinking, perceives the images 01
visiblethings;pislis. which means belief. perceives the sensible things themselves:
diwwi{/. which means structured thought. pereeives the images of intelligible things
discursively: and. finally. noesis. which means intelligence. perceives intelligible things
themselves beyond discursive reason. The images represented by the first and third levels
arc. in part. images in words (Dorter 45).
To further explain his epistemological point. Socrates uses the Cave analogy.
Socrates explains. "And if you assume that thc asccnt and thc contemplation of the things
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above is the sours ascension to the intelligible region, you will not miss my surmise.
since that is what you desire to hear" (517b).IX It is then clear that Socrates wishes the
Cave and Line analogies to be used in conjunction. This proves problematic as Socrates
has recourse only to images in order to explain concepts such as diol/oio andl/oesis.
which are intelligible and non-physical. Nonetheless. a comparison yields interpretative
opportunities. "Picture'" Socrates asks. "men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern
with a long entrance open to the light on its entire width" (514a). In the cave arc prisoners
who have been chained to the ground with their faces locked. staring at a wall. They have
been there all their lives and know nothing else bcsides the cavc. Behind them therc is a
fire and bctwecn them and the fire is a screen. Men walk behind the screcn carrying
various real world objects. These objects are then projected onto the wall in front of the
prisoners as shadows. The prisoners come to believe these shadows to be truth (515c).
Returning to the Line. the point of view of the prisoners can be understood as the first
stcp of the line analogy. eikosio. as we are dealing with images of objects. which are
twice removed from the Forms. Suddcnly. one of the prisoners escapes and is able to see
that the shadows they have taken to be truth are actually imitations of cxtended ubjecls
(5ISc-d). The prisoner has nuw moved unto thc next step.!liSlis. as he is dealing with
extended ubjects. but still not the Forms. The extended objects are "more real" than the
shaduws because the objects are imitatiuns of the Forms. which arc true reality: whereas
the shadows are imitations of imitations. The prisoner now begins to wander out of the
cave and into the outside world. However. the sun hurts his eyes and he is not yet be able
to appreciate the light it provides (S 16a). Now the prisoner has entered the intelligible
section of understanding with the third step in the Line known as thought. Eventually. the
prisoner adjusts his eyes and understands that the sun"provides the seasons and the
courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region. and is in some sort
the cause of all these things that they had seen" (516e). The prisoner has thus completed
the Line of cognitive process and reached the final step of understanding. I/oesis. "Then.
il'this is true'" Socrates argues. "our view of these malleI's must be this. that education is
not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their profession. What they aver is
that they can put true knowledge into a soul that does not possess it. as iI' they were
inserting vision into blind eyes" (S 18e). What Socrates hopes to convey is the process by
which the dialectical method elevates the mind into the purely ralional strata where
virtues such asjustieeean be understood.
The Good can be understood by the analogy of the sun. which is presented as the
son of the Good. In the intelligible realm. the Good plays the same role in relation to the
intellect as the sun does in relation to sight in the sensible realm. Without light. the eye
can sec nothing: but with the sun. everything is illuminated. Likewise. without the sun.
plants cannot exist. and thus without it the whole ecosystem would be ruined.
Accordingly. the Good allows things to be known and provides the capacity of knowing.
Moreover. like the sun. the Good is also knowable (Reale 2(0).
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The Cave analogy is an allegory not only of the progression though the line. but
of the life of the philosopher as well. One of the most striking details of the Cave analogy
is that once the prisoner has been freed from the Cave. s/he must return once again down
into the cave. This is for two reasons. Firstly, ontologically speaking, the philosopher
remains in the sensible realm until death so s/he cannot exist only in the intelligible
realm. Secondly. the philosopher returns into the cave so s/he can assist the other
pnsoners to escape.
We can thus conclude that there is a continuum between eikasil/ to I/oesis and
back to eikasia. This continuum is represented by the cyclical structure of Refil/iJlic. Book
One opens with the famous words. "1 went down yesterday to the Piracus I·· .1" (327).
This is noteworthy for several reasons. One. it is ckarly invoking the image of descent.
The Piraeus was also a port town and thus represents a place of transit. It also juxtaposes
Book Ten. whereby Socrates recounts the Myth of Er. where the souls of the dead
disembark and embark from one life to the next. At the beginning. Socrates has gone
down to the Piraeus to witness the celebration for the goddess Bendis. who was
worshipped with orgiastic rites similar to those of Dionysus (Dorter 23---1). The
n;lcbration entails a horseback race with the riders carrying torches (328a). Conversely.
the goddesses at the enel of the dialogue are the Sirens and the Fates. who sing the
harmony of the spheres. all of whom are in the midst ofa brilliant light that stretches
through heaven and earth (616b-617d). The dialogue thus moves from a goddess
associated with sensuality and is represented by artificial light to goddesses associated
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with the harmony 01" rational necessity and are represented with the natural light 01" the
heavens (Dorter24).
Furthermore, the passage 01" the Myth of Er is precipitated by a lacklustre
definition ol"justice. While Socrates argues the importance 01" establishing a rational
definition of justice. they only ever arrive at images of an ideal state and person. and
I"inally a myth. This makes sense given that the highest level 01" the intelligible is non-
discursive. as explained by the Line and Se\'elllh Lelia. In I?e/){(blic alone, Plato uses the
Cave analogy, the Myth of Metals, and the Myth of Er, all 01" which are imagistic
representations that are meant to explain rational concepts. They are improvements over
the arguments I"rom analogy as they are better received by Socrates' interlocutors than are
the majority 01" his discursive points. especially his contentious retort against
Thrasymachus. But Socrates is adamant that the philosopher cannot be satisl"ied with
images. The philosophical justil"ication I"or the conception ol"justice will have its basis in
the universalizing quality of rationality. which is the basis ol"justice and whieh abstracts
I"rom all individual difl"erences (Dorter 32). However. given the outcome 01" RefJllblic. and
other aporetic dialogues. we are I"mced to question whether this is possible at all.
Moreover. the interlocutors appear to be purposively positioned by Plato to
<.:xpress the reader's inevitable dissatislaction (Dorter 17). There are numerous <.:xamples.
not only in Re/){(b/ic but also throughout the entire Platonic corpus 01" charactcrs
repeatcdly expressing doubts about the persuasiveness 01" Socrates - the supposed
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"spokesperson" 01" Plato - and his arguments. On top of that, Socrates himsell" is
constantly reiterating his own ignorance and dissatisfaction with the diseussion's
outcome. This is hardly the sort of method an author should adopt if s/he wishes the
reader to take his/her writing as established doctrine. Therel"ore, we must conclude that
Plato's dialogues cannot be regarded as orthodoxy. evertheless. the intensity and
thoroughness with which the dialogues are presented indicate that they arc meant to be
taken seriously (Dorter 18). What this means is that what Plato wants to emphasize is not
so much the conclusions. but the paths taken by the characters.
In theSeI'enlh Lel/er. Plato asserts:
One statement at any rate I can make in regard to all who have written or
who may write with a claim to knowledge 01" the subjects to which I
devote mysell" r... 1Such writers can in my opinion have no real
acquaintance with the subject. I certainly have composed no work in
regard to it. nor shall I ever do so in I"uture. 1"01' there is no way 01" putting it
in words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must corne rather after a
long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close
companionship. when, suddenly. like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark. it
is generated in the soul and at once becollle self-sustaining. (3'+Ic-d)
Despite outlining the Illethodology which one must pass through in order to acquaint
oneself with the Forms. Plato is adamant that it is nonetheless rife with inherent l"laws.
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namely language. "One might [... 1speak forever about the inaccurate character of each
of the lour," Plato claims, "The important thing is that [... J there are two things, the
essential reality and the particular quality, and when the mind is in quest of knowledgc
not of the particular but 01' the essential, each of the four confronts the mind with the
unsought particular, whether in verbal or in bodily torm" (343b-c). Each of the four (as
outlined in 342b: a name. a description, an image. and a knowledge of the object) makes
the form that is expressed in words or images liable to refutation by empirical evidence.
meaning all inquisitors are "prey to complete perplexity and uncertainty" (343c).
The issue Plato is stressing here is the problem 01' language. Because 01" the
inadequacy 01" language. the I"irst I"our classes do as much to illustrate the particular
quality 01" any object as they do to illustrate its Form (343). Language can only refer to
particular. discreet entities, not their respective universal Form because language itscll" is
divided and particular. For example, language can speak 01" various triangles. but cannot
rcpresent the Form of triangle. Names. Plato maintains:
arc in no case stable. othing prevents the things that arc now called
round I"rom being called straight and the straight round. and those who
have transposed the names and use them in the oppositc \Vay will I"ind
thcm no less stablc than they arc now. The same thing I"or that matter is
true 01" a description, since it consists 01" nouns and 01" verbal expressions.
so that in a description there is nowhere any sure ground that is sure
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enough. (]43b)
"Ilence:' Plato concludes. ··no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to put into language
those things which his reason contemplated, especially not into a I"orm that is unalterable
- which must be the case with what is expressed in written symbols·' (343). Thc
conclusion we arrive at is that the Forms are non-discursive and cannot be capwred or
perfectly expresseel e1iseursively.
Recall that in Republic. Socrates stresseelthat they should not discuss the Good
itsclf:
Nay. my beloved. let us dismiss I"or the time being the nature 01" the good
i"n itself. I"or to attain to my preselll surmise 01" that seems a pitch above the
impulse that wings my tlight toelay. But 01" what seems to be the ol"I"spring
of the good anelmost nearly made in its likeness I am willing to speak il"
you too wish it. and otherwise to let the matter drop.
Well. speak on. he said. for you will duly pay me the tale 01" the parcnt
another time.
I could wish. I said, that I were able to make and you to receive the
payment and not merely the interest. Bulatany rate receive this interest
and the ol"I"spring 01" the good. Have a care. however. lest I deceive you
unilllentionally with a I"alse reckoning 01" the interest. (.'i06e-507)
38
If we carry this metaphor through, we can conclude that Socrates never manages to pay
down the principle, only the interest. In order to resolve this debt, we must move beyond
what is literally presented in the text (Reale 196).
Giovanni Reale argues that "Plato presents his masterpiece only as the interest on,
or as the offspring of, something he has not trusted to writing, which therefore lies
outside what he has written" (196). Reale asserts. "Plato's written dialogucs are not
wholly self-sufficient but instead stand in need of their author. who offers the key which
opcns all doors [... 1 Thereforc, in reading Plato, we have to employ two distinct
traditions: the direct tradition of his writings, and the indirect tradition of the Unwritten
Doctrincs which have been handed down to us by his followers" (xiv-xv). Reale makes
an important point when he observes that there are inconsistencies in the dialogues. but
he takes a step too l~lr suggesting there are "keys" that could decode the problematic
dialogues lor the reader. For one. the "Unwritten Doctrines" as recorded by various
students and maintained by neo-Platonists show little conformity and splinter otT into
myriad possible interpretive paths.
Secondly, many scholars such as Roland Barlhes. Jacques Den·ida. and Michel
Foucault have cast doubt on the argument that an author can stand over a text and dictate
to rcaders a proper interpretation. In "The Death of the Author:' Roland 8arthcs writcs.
"a tcxt is not a line of words relcasing a single 'theological" meaning (the 'mcssagc' of
thc Author-God) but a multidimensional space in which a variety of writing 1, .. 1 blendlsl
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and clashresl" (876). "To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text.·· Barthes
continues. "10 rurnish il with a linal signilied. to close the writing" (877). For Barthes.
"writing is the destruction or every voice. of every point or origin. Writing is that neutral.
composite. oblique space where our subject slips away. the negative where all identity is
lost. starting with the very identity or the body writing" (875). Accordingly. "'1 text is
made or multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mUlllal relations
to dialogue. parody. contestation. but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused
and that place is the reader. not. as was hitherto said. the author" (877). l3arthes' points
can certainly be applied to Plato's dialogues. Al no point in his corpus does Plato revcal
himselr as author: his voice is constantly deferred and mediated by not just Socratcs. but
by a multitude or voices. In P/WI'l!o. Plato gocs so rar as to announcc his absence (59b).
Thus. Reale is rejecting the possibility that these caesuras are intcrpretive opportunitics:
that Plato is making a philosophical point here.
In P/wl'dms, Socrates asserts that the philosopher does not put the .. things or
greatest value" on paper. but instead writes lhem directly onlo the soul or thc studcnt
capablc or receiving them. Jill Gordon reasons lhal what turns a studcntlowards the valuc
or philosophy "includes necessarily the extralogical. and so is not easily named or
undcrstood by thc analytic method" (4). Irwe are to take seriously Plato's point about thc
Linc analogy. I') wc must conclude that the human condition is limited and cannot havc
"j As wdl '" his poinls ahollllhc SOLI I in Phrwd" and P/1IIedl"ll.l". which will hc discll"cd inchaplcrs Iwo
andlhrcc
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direct. discursive access to transcendent Forms or ideas. Taking this into account. Plalo
cannot rely on rational mcans alone to achieve his philosophical ends. Accordingly. Plato
routinely makes usc of various literary techniques such as metaphor. simile. and irony
(Gordon 2).
Gordon outlines five presumptions that underlie the traditional scholarship of thc
dialogues: I) Thc dialogucs arc intcndcd to convey Plato's thought. 2) Socratcs speaks
II)!" Plato. 3) The argumcnts in the dialogues (usually Socrates') arc thc philosophical corc
of the dialogues and arc the (only) appropriate objects of philosophical analysis. 211 4)
Logical virtues arc philosophical virtues, and likewise, logical vices are philosophical
vices. 5) Catcgorizing thc dialogues into "early." ··middle." and "late" periods in Plato's
writing career is not only possiblc bUI bcneficial to our analysis and improves our
understanding of Plato's thought (6). These are a collcction of various schools of thought
that have imposed a ccrtain rcading upon the dialogues. yCI thcre is nothing wilhin lhc
dialogues themselves to justify any of these claims. Most problcmatic of this lisl arc
arguably I and 2. bccausc accordingly readers Illust try and reconcile the contradiclions
thaI Socrates makcs in diffcrent dialogues. 21 The tcxtual ambiguitics and inconsistencics
~ubvcrt the traditional reading of the dialogucs as "Plato' s thought": II)!' iI' Plato's
intention was to prescnt a compendium of his toughts, hc surcly chosc thc most
incfficicnt mcthod.
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I would agree with Reale that we have to move beyond what is literally written.
but we do not necessarily need to move beyond the text. per se. As Jacques Den'ida
famously claims in ()fCrwlIlI/(l1o!ogy. ..there is nothing outside the text". "A text is not a
text unless it hides from the first comer. from the first glance. the law of its composition
and the rulcs of its game," writes Derrida. "A text remains. morcover. forever
imperceptible. Its law and its rules are not. however. harboured in the inaccessibility of a
secret: it is simply that they can never be booked inthepreselll. into anything that could
rigorously be called a perception" (Di\'\'elllill(/lioll 63). Like Plato's point in the .'lel'ellll,
Lel/er. language - lext especially. as we shall see in PIli/I'di'll\' - cannot be pinned down.
Derridawrites:
The system is not primarily that of what someone meant-to-say lun
vouloire-direl. Finely regulated communications arc established. through
the play of language. among diverse functions of the word. and. within it.
among diverse strata or regions of culture. These communications or
corridors of meaning can sometimes be declared or clarified by Plato
when he plays upon them "voluntarily", ... ,! o absolute pri\'ilcge allows
us to master its textual system. This limitation can and should nevertheless
be displaced to a certain extent. (9)-6)
The text creates a network of significrs for the reader to form various interpretive
connections. Whatever connections Plato"voluntarily"or"intentionally" made should
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not be given priority over other interpretations. a) because we do not have access to his
private thoughts, and b) the problem of language and text. Accordingly. we cannot arrive
at a detinitive interpretation or the dialogues. Den'ida writes. "There is always a surprise
in store ror 1... 1 any criticism that might think it had mastered the game. surveyed all the
threads at once, deluding itself. too. in wanting to look at the text without touching it.
lVithoutlaying a hand on the ·object.· without risking [... 1 the addition of some new
thread" (63). The writer puts the text into play. and the reader is able to tease out various
threads to form various interpretations. That is not to say we are claiming that meaning is
impossible: rather we arc resisting recourse to an unequivocal domination or one
interpretation over olhers. As we shall see in chapters two and three. this is also what the
dialectic seeks to do.
1.6 Summary
Socrates' attack on poetry stems rrom his conviction that it lacks lee/lIIe and is
unable to convey any rorm or knowledge as it is twice removed rrom the Forms.
Philosophy is superior because it has a lee/lIIe called dialectic anel is thus able to convey
knowledge because wilh dialectic one can discuss the Forms. However. this is not
necessarily the case as the Forms cannol in fact be expressed discursively. We can thus
conclude that Socrates' claim of knowledge requiring a /ogo.\' is problematic: problematic
because knowledge is made possible by the Forms and the Good. which are non-
discursive. This or course throws the entire program or philosophy into afloria.
-n
Consequcntly, Plato must find a way to do philosophy in light of the problem of non-
discursiveness, which will bc cxplored in the next chaptcr as wc look at Plwedrtls and
Smlpos;llll1.
While Socrates' faith in logos may bc at odds with his metaphysics. his remarks
about poetry still stand. In Chaptcr Three. we will return to Socrates' remarks about
poetry. and cxplorc a ncw way of critiquing poetry thatmovcs bcyond mimcsis. thus
answering Socrates' challenge at 607d: --And we would allow her advocates who an; not
poets but lovers of poetry to plead her cause in prosc without meter, and show that she is
not only delightful but benelicial to ordcrly govcrnment and all the life ofman.--
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2.1 Introduction
After the points made in chapter one, we are currently lcrt with the problem of
non-discursiveness: the dialectic seems doomed to failure il' the Forms, and therefore
knowledge. are beyond language. Fortunately, SYlllposiulII and Plwedms illustrate the
means by which we can think and speak about the Forms and the Good despite the fact
they are transcend language. In these dialogues we lind strong examples of Plato's
elel/cllus and the challenge of definition with their treatment of the question of heauty. In
the SYlllposiulII especially we see the hubris of the attempt to define as each interlocutor
tries in vain to deline beauty. The word hubristic is appropriate because a delinition's
felo.l· is a bold claim: definition aims to exhaust comprehensively an idea without any
remainders or exceptions.~~Accordingly. Socrates builds his retorts on these
remainders.~·l The implicit claim of a definition is that an idea like beauty can be captured
by logos thaI unites the universal name to the plurality of content. one as concise as to be
called a definition. Accordingly. herein Plato's dialogues struggle. and SyulposiuUl and
Plwedm.I' are no exception. The point to be gleaned from these dialogues is that there is
something about beauty that is inaccessible to logos (Hyland 25). This will lead us to
Plato's ideas on divine madness. divine dispensation. recollection. and eros. And. for the
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purposes of this thesis, it will show us how Plato reconciles the discursive and non-
discursive elements or dialectic. According to the dialectic. definition becomes a process
or opening a sphere or discussion as opposed to a pinning down and dissecting: it is
dynamic and in constant need or revision.
Moreover, Phaedm.\·· discussion or writing illuminates Plato's stylistic choicc or
the dialogue. as opposed to writing treatises. The SecIIl/d and Sel'el/lh Lellers also show
that language cannot capture Plato's philosophy. The dialogucs bypass this problcm by
taking into account the inadequacy or language. Plato docs not use exposition: he uses a
plethora of literary techniques. deferring his voice. and destabilizing the reader leaving
the matter or thought. The dialogues introduce various philosophical problems. and open
dirfercnt avenues ror the reader to continue on with the questioning. the dialectic.
Likewise. SWlfJlISill1ll is an excellent example or how Plato puts this into practice.
Symposium continues !'!wedrtfs' discussion or ems and its relevance to dialectic.
However. in order to analyse properly Srlll!}(}.\·illlll·S points about ems and dialectic.
"'hich is to say Diotima's speech. we must rirsttake into consideration all that has come
bdi.lre it by observing how the various interlocutors' positions arc presented. critiqued.
and then finally sublimatcd in Diotima's speech. Accordingly. taking into consideration
I'lato's points on writing in P!wedms and the SecIIl/d and Sel'el/lh Lel/crs. Snii/}()sillili. on
top or expanding the discussion or i'ms. also shows how a philosophical problem can be
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introduced and discussed, and the way in which the dialectic reconciles the problem of
discursiveness and non-discursiveness.
2.2 Phaedrus
We are faced with a problem after reading Republic: if the Good is so importalll
for living an ethical life. and we are unable to define it or know it discursively. how can
we possibly know it al all? According to Socrates. it is by virtue of recollection. In our
past experience as disembodied souls, we experienced the Good. However. as embodied
souls we cannot clearly envision the Good. Nonetheless. the Good has left a trace on us.
which allows us to intuit it amidst our sensual experience. Eros. the feeling of desire for
the Good that we experience when seeing a particular participating in its respective Form.
is the non-discursive experience that begins the discursive process of recollection. which
ultimately culminates in a non-discursivc intuition.
P//(/edms challenges orthodox Platonism2-l because it seemingly undermines
Socrates' previous points about the value of rationality and the danger ofirrationality.25
Here. Socrates aClUally praiscs madness. particularly divine madness. thus directly
cOlllradicting his argumeills in lOll. Socrates discusses the value of the inspiration from
the Muscs and goes so far as to claim that the most important illlellectual breakthroughs
haveeomebyvirtueofdivineinspiration.Socratesactuallyprivilegcs .. the superiority of
21 11y "orthodox Platonism" we arc rererring to the live assumplions ortraditional scholarship as outlin~d
hyGnrdon (6) on pag~s4.1 and 44
''\This i~ perhaps why the Phaedrus"\Vasobliged to \\ail almost twcl1ty-fivcl:ClllUrics bcfon: anyone: g;I\'c
up Ih~ idea thaI ilwas a hadty composed dialogue" (D~rrida (6)
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heaven-sent madness over man-made sanity" (244d). Socrates is no stranger to this. as he
is often instructed by his dacmon to continue with a discourse. as is the case in the
Ph£/ednrs.~6The Muses are thus associated with the divine and eternal. therefore
representing knowledge for Socrates. The pursuit of the Muses and divine truth is what
scparates rhetoric from dialcctic. bad writing from good, and belierlopinion from
knowledge.
The dialogue begins with Phaedrus reading a text by Lysias discussing love.
Socrates is critical of the piece on the grounds that it discredits the irrational quality of
love. "false is the talc.. ·· proclaims Socrates:
that when a lover is at hand favor ought rather to be accorded to one who
docs not love. on thc ground that the former is mad. and the laller sound of
mind. That would be right if it were an invariable truth lhat madncss is an
cvil. but in reality. the greatest blessings come by way of madness. indccd
of madness that is heaven-sent. (2.+.+a)
This is a sharp turn from Socrates' point in lOll whcn he criticizcs Ion. along with
rhapsodcs and poets in general. for being irrationally drivcn by thc Gods. and posscssing
no real art or technique. Socrates now claims that "i f any man come to thc galcs of podry
without the madness of the Muses. persuaded that skill alone will makehimagoodpoct.
then shall hc and his worksofsanily with him be broughl to naught by the poctryof
'hThi:-.occurs also in Ap%gy and Cri/o
madness. and behold. their place is nowhere to be round" (245a). Nevertheless. Soeratl:s
is ambivalent towards the issue or madness and inspiration. He will try and draw a line
between human madness. which is destructive. and divine madness. which is benevolent.
More specifically, Socrates will show how eros is a form or divine madness. and essential
ror the pursuit of philosophy (Hyland 71). Plato is attempting to emphasize how
philosophy cannot be reduced to a purely logical activity: it is. like poetry. an activity that
involves inspiration (72). This point is illustrated by the metaphorical and poetic quality
or the Chariot Analogy - amongst the many others - and will be sustained by Socratl:s'
point about writing towards the end or Plll/edl'll.\' and Plato's Secolld and Se\'ell/II Lellefs.
In order to prove the value or divine madness. Socrates begins a lengthy
exposition of the nature of the soul. He prefaces his l:xposition by saying thai it will be
persuasive to the wise. but not to the clever (2.+5e). What arc we to make of this
dislinction between the wise and the clever'] Socrates is implying that his account or the
soul will not be logically vigorous. and the clever will be focused on this. but the wise
will look more deeply (Hyland 73). Moreover. Socrates admits that this is only whalthl:
soul Sl:ems to be (2'+6a). I.ike Diotima's speech in S-""II)Osillll and Socrates' Myth or I':r
in the Repllblic. Socratcs' account of the soul in Plll/edrlls is heavily mythologiz.ed and
fictional. That is to say, it is metaphorical/dramatic. and mcaning will thus bl: achievl:d
non-discursively. Plato is thus connecting wisdom with thc ability to interpret non-
discursively. To that end. our analysis will be preoccupil:d more so with the mannl:r in
which Socrates presents the argument. rather than their validity.
49
Socrates claims thal the soul is immortal and subject to reincarnation. To
articulate his point. Socrales uses his famous Chariot Allegory. Socrates describes the
soul as a Charioleer trying to reign in two contlicting horses. one representing rationality
anu the olher representing sensuality. The Charioteers follow the Gods in a procession
around the heavens. but occasionally the unruly. sensual horse will buck. preventing lhe
Charioteer from seeing the different forms of truth. Eventually the unruly horse urags the
Charioteer down to earth and the soul is thus embodied. This passage is instructive for
several reasons. Firstly, Socrates is portraying the gods as purely contemplative. which is
a drastic turn from the more Homeric uepiclion of the gods as having various human
flaws. Moreover. the gods do not speak. They simply repeat the procession over and over
without discussing it. They have no need for dialectic in order to appreciate knowledge:
they simply know itunmediated. Therelore. since the gous' experience ol'knowledge is
unlllediated. they have no need for language. for logos. Logos is thus a human
phenomenon: it is an attempt to eompensale for our incolllplete insight into knowleuge
(Hyland 76). Our incompleteness. which is also elucidated in the SI'IIl!JOSilllll. is
evidenced in the Plwedl'lls by the poverty of our knowledge due to our inferior chariots.
However. the experience of the heavens has left a trace on the soul. and this
allows the soul to experience the Forms represented by matter insofar as sensible
panicularspanicipate in them. Our intellectual experience. un liketheunlllediated
experience of the gods. is two non-discursive moments conjoined by logos. We first have
the non-discursive experience that begins the desire for knowledge. That is to say.
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something happens that makes us want to pursue the discursive struggle towards
knowledge. Secondly. if we are fortunate enough. through dialectic. we may attain a non-
discursive experience. or intuition. of knowledge. This intuition is occasional and brief. It
is incomplete. Logos. and dialectic. are thus in the middle between our initiating and
culminating non-discursive intuitions (Hyland 77). It is what allows us [0 move from that
initial fleeting experience towards drawing some kind of conclusion. as will be seen in
theSrlllpOsillll1.
The soul is reincarnated in a state befitting the level of truth it managed to
experience while in the heavens:
For only the soul that has beheld truth may enter into this our human for-
seeing that man must needs understand the language of forms. passing
from a plurality of perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning-
and sueh understanding is a recollection of those things which our souls
beheld aforetime as they journeyed with their god. looking down upon the
things which now we suppose to be. and gazing up to that which truly is.
('+'+9c)
We gather many perceptions into one using logos and recollection. We recollect the
Forms from our previous disembodied state. and use these universal ideas to bind various
panicular instantiations using logos. It is imponalll to note here the positive role of
recollection and reminders (Hyland 79). Socrates gives panicular focus to the idea of
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beauty (2S0d). Here. Socrates is saying that when we experience beauty in a particular.
physical object. we are reminded of the iuea of beauty. Drew Hyland observes:
In this aeeount I... 1there are two non-discursive experiences in play - one
that originates anu one that culminates our (always finite) understanding
of beauty. First is the non-discursive but extraordinary power nperiellce
of beauty "here" which. in turn. will "reminu"us of our prel'ioll.l' non-
uiscursive experience of beauty itself when we were with our god. One
crucial consequence of this situation needs to be reiterated 1... 1 what
beauty is cannot be reuueed to any sort of "deli nit ion:' even an elaborate
one. Indeed. it cannot even be reduced to a logos. It is inseparable from
non-discursive insight. (X2)
Accordingly. the dialectic that occurs along with our non-discursive experiences will
never replace those experiences: it happens in light of them. That is to say. our ability to
discuss ideas such as beauty is enabled by our non-discursive inlUitions. Dialectic is
therefore the attempted joining of our non-discursive insights (Hyland XX). We are now
~eeing the way in which Plato is able to reconcile the discursive and non-discursive
clements of dialectic. This will be further developed in Snll/)().I'illlll. However. before we
can continue this train of thought. we must now brieny lUrn our attention to the question
of writing.
2.3 On Writing
Phaedms then shifts from an investigation into the soul to a discussion of rhetoric
and writing. The shift is rather abrupt and curious, which leaves us with a number of
interpretive possibilities. One possibility that is relevant to this thesis is to read Socrates'
critique of writing in light of what was previously discussed in regards to epistemology.
recollection. and the soul. On the surface, Socrates is criticizing writing for being simply
a reminder. and not an object of knowledge. However. if we push our analysis beyond the
literal level, we see how writing can supplement and aid the process of recollection.
Moreover. we begin to sec how Plato takes Socrates' points into consideration by writing
the dialogues. Taken as a whole. P/wedms provides insight illlo the style and form of the
dialogues. and how Plato is able to take the risk of writing.
Socrates claims...there is nothing shameful in the mere writing of speeches""
(258d). However. he draws a clear distinction between good and bad writing. Socrates
asks Phaedrus. ""does not a good and successful discourse presuppose a knowledge in the
mind of the speaker of the truth about his subject')" (260e). To which Phaedrus replies:
what I have heard is that the intending orator is under no necessity of
understanding what is truly just. but only what is likely to be thought just
by the body of men who are to give judgment: nor need he know what is
truly good or noble. but what will be thought so. since it ison the latter.
not the former.lhat persuasion depends. (260)
Socrates is thus speaking aboul dialectic whereas Phaedrus is referring to sophistry. What
is at stake here is the pursuit of truth. and Socrates is trying to draw a very fine line
between rhetoric. which is benign in and of itself. and sophistry. Socrates defincs ··the art
of rhetoric" as "a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words" ("261 b). Ilowever.
Socrates is careful to differentiate intluence from persuasion. Accordingly. he cxplains.
"It would seem to lollow l ... 1that the art of speech displayed by one who has gone
chasing after beliefs. instead of knowing the truth. will bc a comical sort of art, in fact no
art at all" ("26"2c). Rhetoric is thusan art when it is being used in pursuit of truth. i.e.
dialectic: whereas sophistry disavows truth and makes man the measure. Moreover.
Socrates explains that there arc two procedures to the dialectic: one "in which wc bring a
dispersed plurality under a single form."' ("265d) and secondly. "The reverse of the other.
whcreby we are enabled to divide into forms. following the objective articulation" ("265e).
Dialectic thus moves in one of two directions: from multiplicity to unity. or from unity to
multiplicity or division. However. as the dialogues show. Socrates is only succcssful in
the latter. nol the former.
Dialectic is thus much more than the arrangemcnt of languagc: it is a movcmCJ1l
towards truth. Socrates compares rhetoric to medicine and concludes. "In both cascs there
is a nature that we have to determine. in the nature of body in thc onc. and of soul ill the
other" ("270b). Likcwisc. "Since the function of oratory is in 1~lcl to inlluencc 111\:I1'S souls.
the intending orator must know what types of soul there arc 1... 1 To the typcs of soul thus
discriminated there corresponds a determinate numbcr of types ofdiscoursc" ("27Id). It is
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therefore the duty of the orator to "on the one hand list the various natures among his
prospective audiences and on the other divide things into their kinds and embrace each
individual thing under a single lorm" (273e). Socrates says as much of poetry. He and
I'haedrus agree it would be ridiculous if"someone went up to Sophocles or Euripides and
said he knew how to compose lengthy dramatic speeches about a trirting malleI'. and
quite short ones about a malleI' of moment [... 1and so forth. and that he considered that
by teaching these accomplishments he could turn a pupil into a tragic poet" (268d). The
dialectician accordingly. "must know the truth about the subject that you spcak or write
about 1 ... 1 secondly 1 ... lmust have a corresponding discernment of the nalLlrc of the
soul. discover the type of speech appropriate to each nalLlre. and order and arrange your
discourse accordingly" (277C).27 Here Socrates is again reaching out beyond logo.\'. lie
acknowledges that one must take the interlocutor (or reader) into consideration when
discussing ideas or Forms. ex The leclllle of dialectic cannot be reduced to any set of
predicates because there must always be an attempt to modify according the infinitely
variable spectra of potential interlocutors in lhat they each bring their own unique mix of
intelligence. experience. expertise. and prejudices. We see this especially played oul in
Srlll!Jo.\'illlll.
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Socrates now moves onto his famous "Myth ofTheuth" and the problem of
writing. Theuth approaches King Thamus. having invented writing. proclaiming it to bc a
mcans for improving memories. To which Thamus replies:
And so it is that you. by reason of your tender regard for the writing that is
your offspring. have declared the very opposite of its true effecl. If men
learn this. it will implant forgetfulness in their souls: thcy will ccasc to
cxercise memory because they rely on that which is written. calling things
to remembrance no longer from within themselves. but by means or
cxternalmarks. What you have discovered is a recipe not for Illcmory. but
for reminder. And it is no true wisdom that you offcr your disciples. but
only its semblance. for by telling them of many things without teaching
them you will make them seem to know much. while for the most part
they know nothing. and as men fillcd. not with wisdom. but with thc
conceit of wisdom. they will be a burden to thcir fellows. (275)
Socrates thus problcmatizes the notion of writing as a great innovation in history. Writing
is a tool for rcminding. but one must be carel'ul that it docs not come to substillllC for
his/her memory. Furthcrmore. writing is eternally siil:nt: "if you ask litl anything about
what Iitl sayIsl. frolll a dcsire to be instructed. Iitl golesl on telling you just the salllc
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lhing forever" (275e). Further still. texts can be misinterpreted and appropriated for
agendas that are contrary to its previous illlention or point?)
However. it is difficult to take Socrates at face value here because his points are
subverted by statements he made previously about reminding and recollection during his
palinode:
For only the soul that has beheld truth may enter illlo this our human rorm
- seeing that man must needs understand the language of forms, passing
from a plurality of perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning-
and such understanding is a recollection of those things which our souls
beheld aforetime as they journeyed wilh their god. looking down upon the
things which now we suppose to be. and gazing up to lhat which truly is
1... 1 Whcrefore if a man makes right use of such means of remembrance
and ever approaches [0 the rull vision or the perrectmysteries. he and he
alone becomes truly perrect. (2-t9c)
Note the play on "recollection" (a)/am)/esis) and "remembrance" (llI"{J0I1lIlesis).311 Here.
Socrates is suggesting that reminders are necessary ror recollection: we recollect the
Forms and the Good because we are reminded or them by physical objects. Furthermore.
Socratesreasonsthatthedialcctician"will sow his seed inlilcrarygardcns I ... jeollecling
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a store of rcli'eshmcnt I... J for his own memory"' (276d). Ilcre Socrates is not only
softcning his criticism of writing. but is suggesting it as a tool for philosophers.
Who are we to trust'? Thamus or Socrates'? What is even more complicating is that
Socrates is quoting Thamus to make his own point! This destabilizing conundrum
provokes the reader into taking some kind of interpretive stance that is not clearly - or at
least not literally - resolved by the text itself (Hyland 120). What we eventually see is
how Plato illustrates the problem of writing and how one can work through it.
At 276£1. Socrates makes an interesting distinction between something that is
written in a text vs. that which is written on the soul:
Socrates: But tell me. is there another sort of discourse. that is brother to
the written speech. but of unquestioned legitimacy"l Can we see how it
originates. and how much better and more elTective it is than the othcr'}
Phaedrus: What sort of discourse have you now in mind. and what is its
origin'}
Socrates: The sort that goes together with knowledge. and is written ill the
soul of the learner. that can defcnd itself. and knows to whom it should
speak and to whom it should say nothing.
Phaedrus: You mean no dead discourse. but the living speech. the original
of which the written discourse may fairly be called a kind of image.
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In the Se\'enlh Leller, Plato refers to the gestation period of philosophical ideas. One must
dwell with an idea before s/he can be said to know or understand it (341 c-d). In order for
something to be written on the soul. or said to be properly recollected. it requires time
and elTort. whereas reading a text or manuscript is a "quick fix'" This is rcminiscent of
Socrates' bullying of Ion. Ion can memorize lengthy speeches - especially those of
Homer - but he has nothing to contribute in a cerebral discussion of Homer or any of the
things about which Homcr writcs. Plato is afraid that someone will simply rcad about an
idea, remcmberthe passage. and erroneously believe that s/he understands il..\1 Rather.
one must go through the lengthy process of recollection. of learning. This is what we
understand by the contrast betwcen rccollection and reminding. Recollection is thc
proccss itself whereas a reminder is a gesture towards what has been. or needs to be.
recollected.
Worse still. Plato fears how easily a text can be misunderstood. In the Second
Leller. he writes:
It is a very great safeguard to learn by heart instead of writing. It is
impossible for what is written not to be disclosed. That is thc rcason why 1
have ncvcr written anything about thcse things. and why there is not and
will not be any written lVork of Plato's own. What are now called his arc
q "1 took a ~pet:d-reading course and read ~V(fr(lf1d Peace inlwcnty minlltes. It involves Russia' -\Voudy
I\lIen
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the work 0" a Socrates embellished and modernized. Farewell and believe.
Read this letter now at once many times and burn it. (314c)
It is tempting to assert that this statement plays into Reale's point that there are ancillary
works that can fill in the gaps that Plato left in the dialogues. However. it would be more
appropriate to assert that Plato's point is that writing in general cannot encapsulate his
philosophical notions (Hyland 94). However, given our previous points. we can take this
a stcp further and assert that language cannot encapsulate philosophical notions. The
problem is that a word cannot directly transmit meaning. There is never a fixed
relationship bctween signifier and signified. so there is always a potential for something
to be lost in translation 32
Nonetheless. it would be egregious to suggest that Plato is anti-writing: he wrote
the dialogues after all. As always. one must be careful when interpreting Plato's supposed
dismissal of writing. Clearly. if we are to take Socrates' word at l~lCe valle then a
philosopher should avoid writing and stick to speech. which is what Socrates did. Yet.
Plato is obviously contradicting his mastcr. What are we to make of this'.' Notc Socratcs'
equivocation of writing and reminding: Socrates is suggesting that writing is not a fonn
llf knowledge: rather it is a reminder of knowledge (Ilyland 121). Recall Socrates'
discussion of recollection and the soul: whenever we see a particular that participates in
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the idea of beauty. we are reminded by the true form that we experience as disembodied
souls. Clearly. Plato docs nol have a problem with reminders and recollection as a means
towards knowledge. Accordingly. earlier in the dialogue, Phaedrus and Socrates arc
discussing Lysias' exposition on love. Phaedrus tries to recall it from memory but is
unable. Socrates learns that Phaedrus actually has the lext with him. and insists that he
read li'om it. Socrates' prelCrence of the text to Phaedrus' memory seemingly eontradicls
his later critique. u Plato is problemetizing the idea of writing in order to get the reader
thinking about the value of wrillen texts (Hyland 122). Butto accept simply the
inadequacy of language and to give up on the pursuit of knowledge and recollection is the
way of the Sophists. To this end, Plato wrote the dialogues taking into account the
inadequacy of language (Hyland 110). The dialogues arc an allempt. as Ilyiand stales...to
limn the possibility of philosophy. to limn ilthrough mimetic portrayal. to limn and invite
the possibility of that life of dwelling-with and its culminating experiences" (Ilyland
1(8).
The dialogues are not to be taken as expositions of Plato's philosophy: they are to
be taken for their mailer of thought. It is likely that Plato took seriously Socrates' poilll
about writing. To that end. Plato did not write treatises: he wrote dialogues.
Consequently. Plato discovered a style of writing that allowed him to take the risk of
writing (Hyland 129). The dialogues affirm a particular form of writing in the light of
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philosophy (Hyland 130). That is to say, the dialogues. with their myriad perspectives.
aporias. contradictions. deconstruct ions. and usages of elenehus. represent a form of
writing that embodies Socrates' metaphysical convictions as seen in RepltiJlic.
SI'1t1I}().I·illlll. and Plli/edms. That knowledge of the Forms is non-discursive. but we must
nonetheless find a way to think about them 34 Plato achieves this because not only do the
dialogues present the mailer or subject of thought (the Forms. eros. etc.) but they also
hegin the questioning process, sometimes by Socrates' own eleltelllls. other times by the
doubts expressed by the various interlocutors. The dialogues are not answering questions.
they hegin the questioning. They provide the materials for a reader to pursue the
questions of philosophy. Nor do the dialogues didactically tell the reader what to think:
they are simply inviting the reader to think (Hyland 131). '-Ience. Plato took himself out
of the dialogues. leaving only the matter of thought (Hyland 128). Plato is not saying.
"This is \\hat you should think'" lie is saying. "Ilere are some things to think ahoul. and
here arc some dil'lerent ways of thinking about them'" The dialogue I<JrITI therefore
reconciles the disparity between discursiveness and non-discursiveness.
2..J.SYlllposiulIl
Snllposiltlll continues the discussion of eros and beauty started in Phaedrus. I:·ros.
Plato argues. is a manifestation of our longing for the good and the beautiful. and is what
fuels the dialectic. As Plato will explain in SI'llI/}osiltlll. eros is triadic. Firstly. it
" Or. 10 Ihink lh~ uillhinbbk. a, DcI~u/.~ 1V0uid say.
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represents our state of incompleteness. Secondly, it is the recognition of our
incompleteness. And thirdly. it is our desire to sublimate and overcome our
incompleteness (Ilyiand 39). Plato's point is that as physical. cmbodied entities we arc
lacking. Accordingly, ems desires what it lacks. and what we lack is the Good - as was
seen in the Line Analogy from Repllblic - therefore we desire it. Moreover. what we
desire is beautiful. That is not to say beauty = the good. but Plato is definitely drawing a
strong connection. Thinking about the beautiful seems to lead us to think about the good.
Beauty is thus a shinning forth of the good (49). Moreover. beauty is the bridge between
the two manifestations of ems. It is a physical and psychic phenomena: Plato speaks of
beautiful bodies and souls (42). Furthermore. eros operates in a sequential manner. We
arc first struck with the pangs of eros when we recognize beauty in a physical object. and
from there we are eventually led towards the good. In terms of the dialectic. we recognize
Lx:auty in the physique of others. then in their spirit and finally. through the process of
friendship and discourse we formulate a proposition that actuates the good to the best of
our ability. However. the sequential methodology of eros is crucial. nless we begin with
at the physical and work our way up. we are in danger of getting the process wrong and
thus losing any potential knowledge provided by the Good. This failure can be seen in the
historic fall from grace of Alcibiades. as alluded to at the end of Snil/)()silllll. Plato is
thercl'ore pushing not only a philosophical point. but a political one as well. That is to
say. unless human project can grasp these concepts of ems wc arc in grcat danger. What
we glean is that in order to perform the dialeetic properly, the initiating and culminating
non-discursive cxpericnces must be given their due.
Moreovcr. we wish to draw particular attention to the form of the dialoguc and
how Plato conveys all these ideas. It is tempting to dismiss everything in the dialoguc and
locus only on Diotima's speech believing this to be the ··point"· of the dialogue. but this
ignores all the attention to detail that Plato has given. SYlIlposill1ll is stagcd in a very
theatrical way. with dircctions. sccne-setting. conflict. ctc. Furthcrmorc. thc argument
dcvclops out of all the points made by thc interlocutors, until Plato sublimatcs what is
nccded by each into Diotima's speceh. Plato has put the reader into the dialectic: we see
how a philosophical argumcnt dcvelops through the various falsc starts and dead-ends or
the different interlocutors. Srlllposilllli can then be taken as a sort of case-study for
observing how Plato writcs in light of the problem of writing that was cxplored in thc
P/wednts. We are intcrested in both the philosophical points that Socratcs makcs using
l)iotima's speech and the way he gets therc35 Thc means are just as important as the
ends. I\s such. \\'e will briclly analyze each participant's contribution to the discussion.
focusing on how it fits within the whole. rinally. wc arrivc at Diotima's specch. \\hich
illustrates how all thc thrcads or a discussion can be wovcn together into a rich. nuanccd
philosophical argulllcnt. More specifically, we see that philosophy docs not happen in a
vacuum: it is occasioned - occasioned not only by discussions and intcrlocutors. but also
" rhis is similar 10 Marshall Md.uhan·s litmous aphorism... rhc mcdium is thc m~ssag~"
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by private, non-discursive moments of inspiration. Taken together. P!laedrus and
S-""11)()silllll demonstrate how philosophy is more than practicing logos.
To start the dialogue. Socrates is invited to a party where each guest must givc a
praise of eros, which eventually turns into an attempt to define it. Agathon asserts they
"shall take up this question of wisdom [... ] and let l3acchusjudge between us" (175e).
Therein. Phaedrus presents a utilitarian position; Pausanias a sophistic; Eryxilllachus a
scientific: Aristophanes a religious: Agathon a poetic: and Socrates, by way 01' Diotima. a
philosophic (Hyland 139). The pusitiuns ur Agathon and Socrates in the speeches
indicate that the primary disputants in the contest arc poetry and philosophy: and the
beautiful Aleibiades. when he later enters the party drunk. isthe personification of
Dionysus (29). Interestingly, Alcibiades first crowns Agathon. but then declares Socrates
the winner. rcferencing once again the"ancient quarrel."
Phaedrus starts the contest claiming:
Thus we find that the antiquity of Love is universally admitted and in very
truth he is the ancient source of all our highest good. For I. at any rate.
could hardly name a greater blessing to the man that is to be than a
generous lover. or. to the luver. than the beluved youth. For neither family.
nul' privilege. nor wealth. nor anything but Love can light that beacon
which amanmust steer by when he sets out to live the bel tel' life. (178c)
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Phaedrus is making a utilitarian claim because he is focused on the gifts that ems brings
to the lover and the beloved. Phaedrus references Alcestis, Orpheus. and Aehilks. In the
first two cases. Phaedrus explains how the beloved benefits from the lovers' respective
sacrifices (179b-e). According to Phaedrus it is best to be a beloved because s/he stands
to gain from all the sacrifices the lover is willing to make. However it is Achilles whom
Phaedrus champions as the greatest lover for his self-sacrifice for Patroclus (17ge-1 XOc).
!\chilles. according to Phaedrus. was Patroclus' beloved. but is nevertheless willing to go
to Troy and sacrifice himself in order to stand by his lover. Phaedrus explains:
I make a point of this because. while in any case the gods display special
admiration for the valor that springs from Love. they arc even more
amazed. delighted. and beneficent when the beloved shows such devotion
to his lover. than when the lover docs the same for his beloved. For the
lover. by virtue of Love's inspiration. is always nearer than his beloved to
the gods. And this. I say. is why they paid more honor to Achilks than
Alcestis. and sent him to the Islands of the Bkssed. (180b)
Phaedrus is arguing that Achilles has no real incentive to sacrifice himself. as he is not
the one that is inspired by ems and therefore docs not desire Patroclus the way Patroclus
desires him: nonetheless. he docs so anyway, which is why the gods are so impressed.
We can surmise that in all cases it is best to be a beloved because the beloved stands to
gain most out of the relationship. By placing all the benefits of I'/'IIS on the side of the
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beloved. Phaedrus is dTeclively disassociating from eros, as the beloved docs not
experience desire (Hyland 31).
Pausanius is next. and he argues one cannot simply praise a single eros. because
there are more than one: kalos and aisehros (beautiful or shameful). Pausanius is a sophist
and a relativist (181 a). However. what is the criterion by which we judge beautiful from
base? !-krein, Pausanius fails. He first tries to establish the distinction based on
homosexual versus heterosexual ems; homosexuality is beauliful, whereas
heterosexuality is base (181 b-e). However. this is problematic given his relativism. He
then tries to base the distinction on the success of the lover. Any behaviour on behalf of
the lover. no malleI' how shameful or base. can be beautiful so long as it seduces the
beloved (lSI a). Plato will build on Pausanius' point that eros is neither inheremly
beautiful nor shameful. but he will try to establish some kind of criterion for beauty.
Aristophanes is scheduled to speak next. but is overcome with a case of the
hiccups. Eryximachus. a physician. olTers Aristophanes lreatmelll and gives his own
oration while Arislophanes rests. While Phaedrus and Pausanius understood ems
primarily as personal. Eryximachus radically expands eros lo the entire physical cosmos.
However. Eryximachus will be unable lo sustain his argument because he cannot resist
making claims that extend beyond the physical (Hyland 34-5). Accordingly. as a man of
science. Eryximachus uses medicine to draw a distinction between beautiful and base
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I proposc. in defercncc to my own profession. to bcgin with thc medical
aspect. I would havc you know that the body comprehends in its very
nature thc dichotomy of Love. for. as we all agrce. bodily health and
sickness arc both distinct and dissimilar. and unlikc clings 10 unlike. And
so the desircs of hcalth are one thing. while thc desires of sickncss arc
quite anothcr. (1~6b)
Eryximachus has thus shifted the dialogue away from the psychic dimension of ('/"os to
the physical (Hyland 35). Furthermore. Eryximachus is pushing his own techne (I S6b-e).
His point is that tcchnc can control the healthy/beautiful and diseased/ugly el'llses oflhe
body. I~ry:\imachus' goal is thus not only to extend eros throughout the cosmos. but also
to control the cosmos using human techne (Hyland 35). To this end. Eryximachus
maintains the distinction Pausanius made betwecn beautiful and base ems (1~6b-c).
However. now. thanks to lee/IIII' we can control ems (I ~nd-e).
Eryximachus thcn begins expanding ems to rcalms bcyond human control (I X~).
Moreovcr. as Eryximachus concludes his speech. he rcturns to Pausanias' psychic
languagc of bcauty. piclY. sO/Jl1rosrlle. and just icc (18~c-d). However. givcn his scientific
reductionism. he seems to bc stepping outsidc his jurisdiction. What Plato achieves with
I:ryximachus' speech and its failure is a critique of1eel1l1e. and its claim to be able to
account for thc entirety orlhe COSIllOS. human experience. and certainly thc realm of
beauty. As we shall see. Plato maintains the expansion of ems on behalf of Eryxil11achus.
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but he is not as reductive as Eryximaehus; eros and beauty will be psychic as well as
physical (Hyland 37).
Aristophanes has now recovered from his hiccups and is ready to participate. Like
Eryximachus. he will continue the discussion of eros in the vein of a metaphysical
phenomenon. in the sense that it is not something we feel; rather it is a condition of our
human existence. Aristophanes tells a humorous tale of ancient people. who were once
joined together like Siamese twins. but wcre thcn split apart by the gods who feared their
power. As a result, we arc searching in vain to rcdiscover our lost unity (SI"III!Josilflf/ 189-
91). Although Aristophanes frames this as a religious account of beauty and eros. we can
see by his narrative that eros is hardly a god at all. It is our human condition after we
have been rcndercd incomplcte from our prior unity3h While Plato will draw on this idea.
hc will be more optimistic about our condition. Aristophancs is indeed decidedly
pessimistic about our condition in that he belicvcs that wc as incomplctc bcings have
desircs that we cannot undcrstand or reconcilc. Wc litcrally cannot know ourselves.
which is in stark contrast to Socrates' mantra of "know thyselL"' I\ristophancs believes
that since we ourselvcs cannot understand our desires. we need religious symbols and
metaphors to try and make sense of it all.·n Furthermore. the most glaring quality of
I\ristophanes' speceh is that it docs not once rclcrence beauty or any of its derivatives: he
has the eros. but not the beauty. Ironically thcn ArislOphancs is only half right. Agathon
will compensate for this omission with his speech. and Plato will sublimate bOlh
positions. along with thc prcvious points. in Socrates' account of Diotima's specch
(Hyland'+I).
If Aristophanes got eros right but beauty wrong. thcn Agathon gets beauty right
but eros wrong. Agathon firmly establishes thc eonncction bctween beauty and eros. lie
says eros is beautiful and lovcs the beautiful. Although Plato will supplant ;\gathon's
assertion that eros is beautiful. we shall see that eros cannot adequately be undcrstood
without invoking its kinship of beauty (Hyland 42). Agathon then creates a link betwcen
eros and creativity (196d-e). The larger claim here is that creativity is the criterion of
wisdom ~ more specifically. poetic creativity. The decisive issuc of the dialoguc now is
whcther creativity or undcrstand. poetry or philosophy. is the highcst human possibility
(Hyland '+2-3). That Alcibiadcs crowns Socrates as the winncr suggcsts Plato is claiming
philosophy as supcrior to poctry. undcrstanding grcater than creativity. but that is to put it
too starkly. It would bc more appropriate to point out the conncction Plato is drawing
betwcen thesc two positions rather than an opposition.
When it is Socrates' turn. he disparages evcrything that has been said thus far but
will gladlytcllevcryoncthc··truth·· ifthcywish to hcarit (19<)b ).Thisishardlythccasc
as Socrates actually sublimates all the points and positions hitherto (Hyland .+3). His first
point is to assert thelllctaphysical principle that"evcrything longs l(lI'what it lacks. and
th;]t nothing longs I()rwhat it docsn't lack" (200b). Furthcrmorc. "dcsiring to sccurc
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something to oneself forever may be described as loving something which not yet to hand
[ ... 1and whoever !Cels a want is wanting something which is not yet to hand. and thc
object of his love [ ... 1 is [ ... J whatever he is lacking in" (200e). lienee. "Love is always
the love of something. and [... 1 that something is what he lacks" (200e). Socrates is
clearly sublimating !\ristophanes' points about eros and the desire for what we lack.
Furthermore. in regards to Agathon. because eros desires what it lacks. and since it
dcsires the beautiful. we cannot say eros is beautiful (20Ib)3x !\gathon's lormulation of
ems was problematic because it failed to recognize !\rislophanes' insight regarding its
incompleteness: for Agalhon. eros is total fullness (Hyland 45). In fact. eros is ncithcr
beautiful noris it bad and ugly: .. the fact is that he's between the two" (202b). Plato has
thus sublimated Pausanius' point that ems is not inherently bcautiful or ugly (Hyland -16).
nlike Pausanius. however. Diotima will establish some sort of criterion by which wc
can judge the beautiful and the ugly.
Ems. Diotima explains. was born from the copulation of Poros (Resoursc. or
Plenty) and Penia (Poverty. Lack) and operates like the spirits who cxist as intcrmcdiarics
between Gods and men (202e). It "includes every kind of longing Illr happiness and lor
the good" (205d). Moreover. "To love is to bring Illrth upon the bcautiful. both in hody
and in soul" (206b). Ems is not. as Agathon claims... the author of thosc very virtucs all
around him" (197e). but rather that which draws us towards said"author" lh<:I-clllre. it is
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illlportant not to confuse eros with the beautiful. Rather, eros is the manifestation of our
desire for the beautiful. Diotima thus establishes eros as the core of philosophy O()Ja).
Philosophers are in between wisdom and ignorance. which explains Socrall.:s· constanl
state of aporia (Hyland '+S). At this point. however. an ambiguity begins to present itself
as to whether eros lksires the beautiful or the Good.
At 206b. Socrates asks Diotima what the function of eros is. 'Love'" Diotima tells
Socratcs. "is a longing lilI' immortality" (207a). Likewise...there·s a divinity in human
propagation. an immortal something in the midstofman's lllortality"006e).I\cncc. wc
long lor "propagation 1 ... 1 bccause this is the one deathlcss and ctcrnal clelllcnt in our
mortality" (206e). l3eeause .. to love is to bring lorth upon the beautiful. bOlh in hody and
in soul" 006b). we arc therefore cOlllpclled to actualizc thc bcautiful in the limn of
procreation. In terms o,'the "body'" all lite forllls wish to produce offspring (207a-h).
Conversely, in terllls of the ··soul." there is the desire 10 beget wisdom COSa-e). IJere. the
activity of proereat ion is the engagement ofli'iends in the dialectic. In \\hich case ··the
bond bet\\"Centhem will be more binding 1 ... lthan that \\hich coIlles of bringing children
up.becausetheyhavccreatcdsolllethinglovclicrandiesslllortalthan human seed"
(209c). l\cre wc sec thc value ofAgathon's insistence on the connection of eros and
beauty. That is to say. the creative urge is predicated upon erotic desire. Moreover. this
urge is to create both in the body and in the soul. Beauty exists both in body and in soul.
Beauty is thercrore the bridge that connects the physical and psychic Illanil"cstations of
nO.1 (Hyland 50).
This relationship orthe physical and psychic is elucidated by Diotima's "heavenly
ladder." The tist step or this relationship is for one to "rail in love with the beauty or one
individual body, so that his passion may give life to noble discourse" (21 Oa). "Next"
Diotima explains "he must grasp that the beauties or the body are as nothing to the
beautiesorthe soul" (210b). Thus it is crucial that one start "rrom individual beauties
1... 1 evcr mounting thc heavcnly ladder, stepping Ii'om rung to rung" (21 Ic).''! Finally,
alicr he has moved li'om physical beauty to the spiritual. "he will come upon the one
single rorm of knowlcdgc" (21 Od). i.c. thc good. Ems is. theldore, what drives the
dialectic. Ems pulls us through each step or the dialectic until we reach its ultimate goal.
the good. However. ir the good is the Ie/os or ems whcre docs that leave beauty? Plato
certainly is not implying that they arc the same because Diotima and Socrates clearly
dirrerentiale betwccn the two. Nonetheless. Plato is certainly putting the two in rdation to
each other. We can surmise li'om Diolima's speech that thinking about the beautirul
inevitably invokes the question or the good. Each puts the other in question (Hyland-l9).
Beauty generates rurtherbeauty. We are attracted to physical beauty initially. and that
experience or beauty results in the generation orrurther beauty. this time psychic beauty:
beautirul speeches and beautirul/ogoi. But what makes us move rrom the initial physical
experience or beauty? It is the component or reason within erotic experience that makes
us see that there are eventually higher rorms or beauty (Hyland 54). This evidenced by
"'So Illllch forPlalo'sslIpposcd hatred of the body.
the movement after the initial experience of beauty when we experience it embodied by
an individual:
First or all 1... 1 he will fall in love with the beauty of one individual body.
so that his passion may give life to noble discourse. ext he must consider
how nearly related the beauty of anyone body is to the beauty of any
other. when he will see that if he is to devote himself to loveliness of rorm
it will be absurd to deny that the beauty of each and every body is the
same. Having reached this point, he must set himself to be the lover of
every lovely body. and bring his passion for the one into due proportion by
deeming it of little or of no importance. (:lIOa-b)
Each moment of ems is thus infused with reason and thinking (Hyland 5-1).
Nevertheless. while the process of ems is infused with reason. the final
experience of beauty and the good are non-discursive:
And. turning his eyes toward the open sea ofheauty. he will find in such
contemplation the seed of the most fruitful discourse and the loftiest
thought. and reap a golden harvest of philosophy. until. confirmed and
strengthened. he will come upon one single rorm or knowledge. the
knowledge or the beauty I am about to speak of [... 1 Nor will his vision or
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the beautiful lake the form of a face, or of hands, or of anthing that is of
the llesh. It will be neither words. nor knowledge [... J (21 Od-211 a)
Thus far. the ascent to beauty has occurred discursively; each transition to a higher stage
is accomplished by a process of reasoning. But now. at the highest level, something
different is happening. For one thing. it is "suelden." which suggests the final transition is
non-discursive or non- methodological. There is no logos here. it is a sudden epiphany
(Ilyiand 56). Moreover, in Diotima's account of the insight into beauty. there is actually
nothing definitive about bcauty; we are told what beauty is not. We are mostly given a
generic account of the nature of formal slructure. What we do learn is that insight into
beauty itself. or into any form, cannot be articulated by any definition. logos, or
discursive demonstration (57). This is the meaning of the l'ailure of Plato's aporctic
dialogues. Insight into a form is non-discursive: it is noetic. not dianoelic. onetheless,
while insights are not demonstrable, we have discourse in light of these insights (Sg).
Furthermore, the insight is not even the final step. as Diolima tells us (21Ie-212a).
Diotima's point is that insight into forms is not an end in itself: the Ie/os of the dialectic is
a virtuous way of life. Virtue. though integrally and intimately involved with knowledge
and logos, cannot be reduced to these (Hyland 59). Virtue is not a techne. which is why
Socrates and his various interlocutors are able to define the lattcr but not the former
throughout the dialogues. It also cxplains why the Philosopher must return to the cave in
RI'/Jl/IJ/ic.
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However. it is crucial that the methodology orthe "heavenly ladder" be observed.
This is by no means a trivial misunderstanding. and its consequences extend beyond
stumped intellectual growth. The impending political disaster of not adhering to eros and
not appropriately engaging in the dialectic can be seen in the fate of Alcibiades. After
Socrates ends his enactment of Diotima's speech. a drunken !\Icibiades enters the party.
He is asked to contribute his own exposition on Love but instead oilers a praise of
Socrates and describes his failed attempts to seduce Socrates. Alcibiades explains that
when he is with Socrates he is smitten with a "philosophical li'cnzy I... Ila] sacrcd ragc"
(218b). Ilowever. as Socrates tells Alcibiades. "ifyou'rc trying to barter your own bcauty
for the beauty you have found in me. you're driving a hard bargain 1 ... 1 You're trying to
cxchangc the scmblance of beauty lor the thing itsell" (218e). !\Icibiadcs is thus working
down the ladder by starting with an attraction to Socrates' spirit and from there mO\'ing
oJ1l0 the physical. !\s Socrates points out. ""the mind's eye begins to see clearly \\ hen the
outer eyes grow dim - and I !"ancy yours are still pretty keen" (219a). Consequently.
Alcibiades cannot continue along the dialectic and come to contemplate the Good.
Historically. Alcibiades would prove to be a hugely controversial figure in the
Pcloponnesian War. Plato is clearly making a significant point by ending the Sn/ll}()si/llll
with Alcibiades. and his contemporary audience. as well any present reader who is versed
in history. would have imlllediately identified its effect. Plato is thus making a direct link
belween!\lcibiades" failureasadialecticianandhissubsequentwarcrimes.lI·wedonot
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grasp the importance of ems and the dialectic. Plato warns. we are bound to make the
same sort of mistake as Alcibiades.
Dialectic is therefore the discursive joining of two non-discursive moments: an
initiating. physical experience and a final. intuitive moment. This is how Plato reconciles
discursiveness and non-discursiveness. Alcibiades fails to grasp the importance of the
initialing non-discursive moment that represents the first rung of the heavenly ladder. so
he is never able to participate in the dialectic. In a way. Alcibiades is obsessed with
logos. He thinks he can disregard the physical. believing that Socrates can prescribe to
him in some formalized way the Forms and the Good. but this is nol the case. as Socrates
points out. for philosophy is more than logos.
2.5 Summary
We can thus see how Plato is able to write about ems and the beautiful. two non-
discursive ideas. using the dialoguc's form. at only docs Plato take some intcrprcti"c
stands on eros by way of Diotima. he also illustrates the different paths one can take
when approaching ems. as can be seen with the various accounts from the different
interlocutors. Plato has thus tabled. moderated. and lead the discussion of ems.
Moreover. by introducing ems and recollection into the discussion. Plato has
expanded philosophy beyond the application of logos: thcre is a definite illogical.
irrational quality to philosophy. Taking this and his use ofthc dialoguc's form IVC can
conclude that philosophy is a much more open arcna lor discussion than Socratcs'
commcnts in ReplIIJlic. Thealeilis. and lOll would have us belicvc. This thcn opens the
possibility 1"01' poetry to once again come onto the scenc. as we shall explore in the next
chapter. Specil"ically. we will see how poetry can contributc to that initializing. non-
discursive moment. thus dissolving the main tension between philosophy and poetry.
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3.1 Introduction
In Chapler One. we eSlablished Plala's alleged problem with poelry and why he
thinks philosophy is supposedly beller; Socrates claims poetry is irrational and illogical.
whcreas philosophy provides objeclive answers with a logos. Howcvcr. in Chapter Two.
we deconstrueted this notion of philosophy and objectivity. and introduced the role of
non-discursiveness. Thc Forms and the Good, which for Socrates rcpresent the actual
objects of knowledge, cannot be known or expressed discursively. So what are we Icrt
with') As we saw with Plwedms and Smll)Osilllll. Plato is able to take the risk of writing
using the dialogues' formal. and write philosophy in light or the problem or non-
discursiveness. I ow in Chapter Three. we shall return to the problem posed by lOll and
Ref/lIiJ1ic: namely. what is the lec/llle of poetry. and how can it cOlllribute to the pursuit of
knowledge')
Our response can be ti.JlInd by way or Viktor Shklovsky"s "I\rt as Techniquc" and
his ddinition of poetry as dcrallliliarization. According to Shklovsky. poetry is not ahout
recreating experiences: it is about challenging our perception of experience. That is to
say. the goal of poetry is not to represent a sunrJower as facsimile as possible. it is to play
with our idea of a sunrJower. Poetry, like the dialectic. exposes the individual to his/her
own ignorance. Furthermore. poetry pulls the individual fromlhc initial experience 01
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materiality to the realm of ideas, as explained in the Cave analogy. Therefore. poetry is
more than mimesis: it is an occasion for thought, and Plato himself often employs it.
This idea of defamiliarization fits nicely within Platonism, as we can see by the
"numbing" of Meno at the hands of Socrates. In the Mello. we see one of the strongest
examples of the elenchus. as we observe the ways in which Socrates exposes Meno to his
ignorance. The elenchus is thus a stance towards experience that preveills us from gelling
too comfortable in anyone belief. This is important because if we cannot have full.
discursive knowledge of the Forms and their relations that tic the particulars 10 them Ihen
we cannot possibly have a dcfinitive position on anyone issue or concept. Therefore. we
must always be willing to change them whenever recalcitrant evidence presents itsel!".
This is what Plato shows us how to do in the dialogues. They arc guides 10 critical
thinking. They arc metaphysical challenges. encouraging us to be elernal skeptics. but not
nihilists.
Likewise. poetry can provide us with a similar opportunity to test our thoughts
and positions. Shklovsky's theory ofdcl~1Il1ilirization is analogous to Socrates' clenchus.
We can link theexpericnccofreading poetry as described by Shklosky\\"ith Socratcs'
"numbing" of Meno. Wc will begin this chaptcr by cxploring Shklovsky's conccpts of
algebrization and defamiliarization. We then move to Meno 10 delineale how Socrates
"numbs" his interlocutors. Finally. we C"nd by unifying Shklovsky and Plato. dissolving
Iheljuarrel between philosophy and poC"try.
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3.2 "Art as Technique"
In "Art as Teehniquc··. Shklovsky describes the "algcbrization" of the world. and
how poetry can dcstabilize its effects. Perception. according to Shklovsky. becomes
automatic. lie states. "Ifwe start to examine the general laws of perception. we see that
as perception becomes habitual. it becomes automatic [... 1Such habituation cxplains the
principles by which, in ordinary speech. we leave phrases unfinishcd and words half
exprcssed. In this process. ideally rcalized in algebra. things arc rcplaccd by symbols"
(77'13). In our everyday experience of the world and its ontological furniture. we reduce
the duration of perception through habit. As a result:
we apprehend objects only as shapes with imprecise extensions: we do not
see them in their entirety but rather recognize them by their main
characteristics. We see the object as though it were enveloped in a sack.
We know what it is by its configuration. but we see only its silhouette. The
object. perceived thus in the manner of prose perception.jo. fades and does
not leave even a first impression: ultimately even the essence of what it
was is forgotten. (778)
Shklovsky is thus making an important phenomenological claim. We perceive objects not
as they are. but reduced to the parameters of our subjectivity. and we do this through
habit. Consider. for example. the way in which children experience objects that adults
11IThisisaicchnicallcnn l"orShklovksy.and will hccxplaincd insuhsclluclll paragraphs
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take for granted. A child is the closest thing we know to a tabula rasa; accordingly. s/he
does not have the same values of worth that adults do for objects. More often than not. a
child will ignore an expensive toy set and play with its respective box. A child can said to
have a pronounced sense of wonder about the world around him/her. Likewise. wonder.
as we shall see. is crucial for the philosophical project.
Shklovsky's point about algebrization is analogous to Socrates' discussion of
eika.l'i{/ and its representation in the Cave analogy. Eika.l'ia is at the bottom of the line
analogy and is traditionally translated as "imagination:' but this is problematic. Eikl/.I'i{/ is
bctterrcpresentedinEnglishas"piclUre-thinking:'Wecanthusconcludethateik{/.I'illisa
subjective. virtual representation of a thing. idea. or concept. Socrates explains:
And if there had been honors and commendations among them which they
bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make
out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary
precedences. sequences. and coexistences. and so must successful in
guessing at what was to come. do you think he would be very keen about
such rewards. and that he would envy and emulate those who were
honored by these prisoners and lorded it among them. or that he feci with
Homer-ll and greatly prefer while living on earth 10 be serf of another. a
II Once again. Socrates draws on apoclIOlllakeapoinl
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landless man. and endure anything rather than opine and live that life'!
(5 I6c-d)
The prisoner's predictions are not based on any kind ofundcrstanding of what thcy
observe (i.e. recollection). but only on customary (eio/hei) sequences. which is to say
habit (Dorter 204). It is also significant that Socrates would associate this mode of
thinking with chained prisoners observing shadows of objects beyond carried by their
captors. Earlier in the Republic. Socrates illustrates his distaste for assemblies.
courtrooms. and other public gatherings. observing how people aggressively object to
things they dislike and loudly champion those they do, and resort to depriving civil rights.
imposing fines, and even threatening death upon those who disagree (492a-d).~2 This sort
of peer pressure and coercion upon public discourse is represented by the prisoner's
enchainment. and the puppeteers represent those who seck to manipulate the discourse
towards their own ends (politicians. sophists. elc.) (Dorter 20-1). Douglas Robinson
delines this as the proprioception of lhe body politic: "this infectious channeling of group
norms from one body to another. in the form of verbally or non verbally signaled
ideosomoatic pressure to conlorm to collective expectations" (109). We can thus
recognize a similarity of approach between Plato's ei/.:asia and Shklovsky"s algcbrization.
Shklovsky's point about algebrization is that it limits our expericnce. "i\!"terwe
sec an object several times:' explains Shklovsky. "we begin to recognize it. The object is
"OIlC III list ol"collrscwkc illlOCOllsidcratioll Socrates' 1;lIe. alld how Ihisillllmllsl'lalo's\\,rilillg
83
in front of us and we know about it, but we do not see it - hence we cannot say anything
signilicant about it" ("Art as Technique" 779). Shklovsky is drawing a distinction
between "idellie. the Russian lor "seeing." and lI':.II(/\'(/lIie. "to be recognizing. to be
learning. to be linding out. to be getting to know." The distinction is that 1I:1I(/\'(/lIie is
associated with repetition (Robinson 119). This type of automatized perception that
Shklovsky discuses is similar to Socrates' point about reminders in the P//{/edms and the
SeeO//d Leller: that when someone reads something written s/hc will take for it granted
and not bother with the lengthy process of recollection.
Ilowcver. "Art removes objects from the automatism of perception in several
ways" ("Art as Technique" 779). Art breaks our habitual experience of the world and
forces us to re-examine it. Shklovsky explains how:
Art exists so that one may recover the sensation of life: it exists to make
one feel things. to make the stone stoney. The purpose of art is to impart
the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known.
rhe technique of art is to make objects "unl~lmiliar." to make forms
difficult. to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the
process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged.
Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object: the object is not
important. (778)
84
What exactly does Shklovsky mean by "unfamiliar" and "defamiliarizng···)41 As an
example. Shklovsky points to "Tolstoy's way of pricking the conscience" (779).
Shklovsky remarks how "Tolstoy makes the familiar seem strange by nol naming Ihe
familiar object. He describes an object as if he were seeing it for the first lime. an event
as if it were happening for the first time. In describing something he avoids the accepted
names of its paris and instead names corresponding parts of other objects" (779).
Shklovsky cites Tolstoy's "Kholstomer.·· in which the narrator is a horse:
I understood well what they said about whipping and Christianity. But
then I was absolutely in the dark. What"slhemeaningof··hisown..· ..his
colt..? From these phrases I saw thai peoplc thought there was somc sort of
connection betwecn me and the stable. At the timc I simply could not
understand the connection. Only much later. when they scparated me from
the other horscs. did I begin to understand. But evcn then I simply could
not see what it mean when they called me "man's property'" The words
"my horse" relcrred to me. a living horse. and seemed as strange to me as
the words"my land ..· ..my air..···my water'"(779)
Tolstoy is thus dcfamiliarizing the conccpt or idea of ownership by describing it through
the perspective of a horse. a creature that is supposedly somcthing to be owned. The point
is that it is not customary to consider possessions as anything but possessions: how they
may exist otherwise docs not enter into our habitual perception. Tolstoy forces the reader
to reconsider his/her concept of ownership and that which we believe we own. In a way.
poetry brings us back to a childlike state by destabilizing all the parameters accumulated
over time through habit thm we have heaped upon the objects experience. Poetry breaks
us from preconceived. habitualized ideas. We think we know something. but poetry
exposes our ignorance and tests our presumptions. just as Socrates docs with the
dialectic.
For Shklovsky. there are two types of imagery: 'imagery as a practical means of
thinking, as a means of placing objects within categories: and imagery as poetic. as a
means of reinforcing an impression" (776). The former. prosaic language. is about
simplifying expressions to frictionless statements that convey meaning without giving too
much pause for thought. whereas "Poetic imagery is mcans or creating the strongest
possible impression" (776). By "strongest possible impression:' he means ":lflect" or
"pereeption:'ConsiderGertrude Stein's famous phrase. "/\ rose isa rose is a rose:'
Stein's point is that a signifier is multiple things. /\eeordingly. one can represent a rose
prosaically or poetically. One could say. "1 am planting roses:' meaning s/he isdoing
some gardening. On the other hand. one could express a rose poetically. such as
Shakespeare in ROil/eo (/1/(/ Jllliel when he writes. "a rose / By any other name would
smell as sweet" (1I.ii. 47--18). Shakespeare is being poetic because he is dcfamiliaril.ing
Ihe way in which we name things. in that he is drawing attention to the I~lct that "rose" ;\s
a signilier onlhe aellial object: ira roses were called 'toses"they \\ould still smell
86
sweel.~~ The difference is that Shakespeare gives pause for thought and forces the reader
lO consider the imagery, whereas as the prosaic statemel1l achieves meaning simply and
directly. Moreover. when Shklovsky pontificates upon the consequences of algebrization.
he is not speaking merely of material objects, but of close human relationships and
collective societal norms: "Automatization swallows up things. dress. furniture. one's
wilC. and the lCar of war" (Robinson III). "At the loundation ofarl." writes Shklovsky.
"lies a striving to penetrate through to lile" (91). Therelore.like Plato's point in the
Sel'enlh Leller about philosophy's movement beyond language, lor Shklovsky the
purpose of poetry is [0 push the reader past language to a reworking of perception.
Shklovsky's useofthe terms ().I'lranenieand lI;.nul'llnie arc appropriate because
the estrangemel1lthat one feels once a habitual experience has been destabilized can
indeed be violent. Robinson warns that Shklovsky docs not recognize a form of
().I'lranenie that goes too 1~1r. that feels "overstrange. nightmarishly surreal. and the
resulting depletion of rell connection with individualized collective reality can !lip us
over into disturbing or disoriellling depersonalization" (100). Ilowever. arguing Ilx a
kinder. gCl1ller ().I'lranenie is to miss the point. RelLlrning to the Cave analogy. Doner
IVrites.··[hegreatesldiseo11linuityinthccaveisbetweeneikii.l'iu and the other levels.
because thal is the only point at which the prisoners must be freed from their chains alld
Il)rcibly turned around" (62). Socrates goes to great lengths lo describe the physical
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discomfort the prisoner fe.::ls when he is released from bondage. .::xposed to the tlame.
and subsequently dragged out into the light. Clearly, this is not a comfortable or
pleasurable experience. It is thus no coincidence that Socrates often talks about Ixing
"courageous" and taking the "risk" of philosophy/dialectic. This exp.::rience of the
prisoners. thejump from eik(/.I'i(/. is very much congruous with Shklovsky"s usag.:: of
ddamiliarization. The .::xposure of ignorance and breaking of habit is strange and
lkstabilizing. Accordingly. like Socrates. poets hav.:: also been ostracized and blacklist.::d
from soci.::ty throughout history for controversial writings.
Ih: dcramiliarizing quality of poetry is thus analogous to Socrates' cknchus. The
similarities between the two positions can further be elucidated by examining th.:: Mel/II
and Socrates "numbing"' an'cct on Meno and the Slave !3oy.
J.JMeno
Mel/II recounts a discussion between Socrates and Meno. who are trying to ddine
virtue. Socrates is confident in the project because. as he .::xplains. those who ar.::
"divinely inspired."' such as the priests and poets. assert that we arc not born into the
material world as blank slates. That is to say. the soul carries with it its past IiI".:: in and
amongst the Forms and the gods. as Plato also explores in th.:: P//{/edl"ll.l'. Howev'::L th.::
dialogue concludes with an aporia. as Socrates surmises that virtue is not an object of
knowledge and therefore cannot be taught.
The dialogue begins with Meno asking. "Can you tell me. Socrates - is virtue
something that can be taught') Or docs it come by practicc? Or is it neither teaching nor
practice that gives it to a man but natural aptitude or something else'!" (70). To which
Socrates admits his "shame that Ihe hasjno knowledge about virtue at all" (71 b). We will
sec this dynamic of question and non-answer throughout MellO. Mcno is cast as a poor
dialectician because he offers none of his own convictions and is constantly demanding
answers from Socrates.4 :i Plato is demonstrating the attitude of students taught by the
Sophists. as Meno was taught by the legendary Gorgias. As such. Meno is hesitant to
think on his own and refers either to the supposed authority of Gorgias or simply asks
Socrates for the answer (Gordon 101). This also speaks to our previous point about
Shklovsky's algebrization and the body politic and its connection to Socrates' rant
against the bullying by politicians and sophists in the Relll/iJlic. Thc body politic enforces
norms upon individuals. habitualizing them into thinking according to pre-cstablished
code. Accordingly. Meno has been automized by the authority of Gorgias and merely
answers out of habit as opposed to thoughtfully. Socrates is trying to pull Mcno out of his
ilabitualized thinking. and forcc him to start thinking about philosophical concepts
beyond what has been didactically prescribed to him.
Accordingly. when Socrates pushes Meno for his ideas. Meno provides (iorgias'
delinition: "For every act and every time of life. with rel"crence to each separate function.
there isa virtuc for each one of us. and similarly. I should say. a vice" (n). Meno
I' Not unlikc,\lcihidcsinSy",!}()silllll
explains how there is a virtue for man that is different from the feminine virtue. that of
the child. that of the slave, etc. But Socrates is unsatisfied by this because Meno has only
given a list of instantiations and not the thing in itself. "What is that character in respect
of which they don't difkr at all. but arc all the same'-' (72c) Socrates asks. "Even if they
arc 1 ... 1 various'-' Socrates explains. "at least they all have some common character
which makes them virtues. That is what ought to be kept in view by anyone who answers
the question. What is virtue')"' (72d). In the Pill/I'di'll.\'. Socrates explains that there arc two
possible movements in the dialectic. movemelll from a prior unity to a Illultiplicity. and
from a multiplicity to a unity. In this case. Socrates wishes to pursue the laller. However.
as we shall sec. this is not possible.
Like many of the other aporelic dialogues. language is the ghost that haullls
/lifeI/O. For example. Meno states. "justice is virtue'-' to \\'hieh Socrates replies. ··Virtue.
do you say. or a virtue' I " (73e). Socrates is reminding Meno to be careful not to confuse
justice with virtue qua virtue. which is to say. justice is one of several virtues. not virtue
itself. This is a confusion of the copula. If I say. "The book is blue'-' I mean to say it
possesses the quality of blue. not that it is itsell' blue qua blue. But Socrates and Meno
can never seem to avoid this dead end. 'We always arrive at a plurality'-' obser\'es
Socrates:
but that is not the kind of answer I wanl. Seeing that you call these many
particulars byone and the same name. and say that everyone of them is a
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shape. even though they are the contrary of each other. tell me what this is
which embraces round as well as straighl. and what you mean by shape
when you say that straightness is a shape as much as roundness. Old)
It is at this point that the Sophist will throw his/her hands up and claim that there is no
absolute measure, so man is the measure: that it is the perceiving subject that determines
the nature of the objecl. which is total relativism ..)(' However. this is where Plato takes up
arms and launches into battle. In the P/we£!o, Socrates slates:
ifanyone nevcrtheless. through his experience of these arguments which
seem to thc same people to be sometimes true and sometimes raise.
attached no responsibility to himself and his lack of technical ability. blll
was rinallycolllenl. in exasperalion.toshiftthe blame from himself to the
arguments. and spend the rest of his life loathing and decrying them. and
so missed the chance of knowing the truth about reality - would it not be a
deplorable thing? (90d)
I-Ie refuses to be satisried by the Sophistic position. and asserts that we really do possess
the ability to idcllliry virtues and/or rorms:
We must not let it enter our minds that there Illay be no validity in
argumenl. On the contrary wc should recognize that we ourselves are still
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intellectual invalids, but that we must brace ourselves and do our best to
become healthyl ... j (90e)
Plato shows as much in Lac/res when Socrates discusses the virtue of courage with his
comrades. They have all been accredited for being courageous warriors, and have
themselves witnessed courage and cowardice on the field. But. no malleI' how hard they
try they are unable to muster up a satisfactory dcfinition of courage. This is the famous
denchus. but Socratic skepticism should not be taken as misology. Rather. dialectic is a
means both to discover one's ignorance and overcome it (Gordon 38). furthermore, as
Socrates observes in the Thealellls, philosophy begins with wonder (155d), and \Vonder
stems from aporia, a real sense and recognition of ignorance (Gordon 1(9).
So, the question is, how can one be virtuous if one is not able to articulate it'l
According to Socrates, it is by the process of recollection. Meno summarizes the problem
as such:
But how will you look for something when you don't in the least know
what it is? Ilow on earth arc you going to set up something you don't
know as the object of your search'! To put it another way, even if you
come right up against it. how will you know that what you have found is
the thing you didn't know'? (MellO l'\Od)
Socratcs rejects this and draws on the ideas of the priests and "poets who are divincly
inspircd" (Sib). Socrates explains:
They say that the soul of man is immortal:', 'At one timc it comcs to an
cnd - that which is called death - and at another is born again, but is ncvcr
linallycxterminuted l... 1Thus the soul. sincc it is immortal and has bccn
born many times, and has seen all things both here and in the othcrworld,
has Icarnedeverythingthat is. (glb-c).
Thc point here is the same as that in P/wedrlls. Our souls arc immortal and have
knowlcdge of the forms before they are cmbodied. In Mello, Socratcs stresscs the
hermeneutical aspect of recollection by using the Slave Boy dcmonstration.~7
Meno rcfcrs to this hermcneutical proccss as a "numbing":
I think 1 ... 1 you are exactly like the !lat sting ray that one meets in thc sca.
Whenever anyone comes into contact with it. it numbs him, and that is thc
~ort of thing thai you sccm to bc doing to mc now. My mind and my lips
arc litcrally numb. and I have nothing to reply to you. Yct I havc spokcn
about virtue hundreds of times, held forth oftcn on the subjcct in front nf
largc audicnccs, and very well too, or so I thought. Now I can't evcn say
what it is. (gO)
"The poil1l we: areelllplla,il.il1g h,"re is ree",lIeclioll. The metaphysical ill\'c~tigatiun or the ~oul is a
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Meno spoke of virtue out of habit- a habit that was instilled by Gorgias' "authority."
Ilowever. Socrates has defamiliarized Meno's idea of virtue leaving him "numb'"
Likewise. the Slave Boy has a similar "numbing" experience when Socrates begins
quil.Zing him on geometry. Indeed. the demonstration with the Slave Boy can be
illlerpreted as a microcosm of the Mello (Gordon 105). Initially. the Slave Boy claims to
know how to solve the geometrical problcm that Socrates proposes. but he reaches an
impasse soon enough and admits his ignorance. Herein. we sce the value of
dcfamiliarization because now the Boy has realized his ignorance and is on the way
towards the true answer. which he would not otherwise seek (MellO X-l). When the Boy
has solved the problem. Socrates points out to Meno how he did not give the Boy any
new information. but rather pulled it out by asking the appropriate questions. Socrates
concludes:
a man who docs not know has in himself true opinions on a subject
without having knowledge l ... 1/\t preselllthese opinions, being newly
aroused. have a dn.:amlike quality. But if the same questions arc pUlIO him
on many occasions and in different ways. you GIn sec that in the end he
\\ill ha\'ea knowlcdgeonthesubjectasaccurateasanybody"s. (X5c)
I"hercfore, 'ifthe truth about reality is always in our soul. the soul must be immortal. and
one must take courage and try to disclJver-that is. to recollcct-\\hat one doesn't
happen to know. or, more correctly, remember. at the mOl1lent"(X6b). Thedialectie is
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thus a process of drawing out knowledge of the Forms by a series of questioning. Recall
once again Socratcs' point abollt midwifery in Tltealellls ..Jx There arc ideas waiting inside
us. and the dialectic brings them to fruition by drawing them out using appropriate
qucstions. As Socrates explains in the P/wedms. a skilled dialectician is able to
accommodate each particular individual. establishing his/her nceds. and molding the
dialectic to rit them.
Unfortunately for Socrates, virtue proves to be more elusivc than geomctry.
Unlike mathematical problems, virtue cannot be formalized into an equation. It cannot be
"pinned down'" so to speak. As it stands. one can have true opinions of virtue. but not
knowledge. If s/he were able to recollect. then s/he could "tie down" his/her true opinions
and make them knowledge (98): but the argument keeps slipping out from under them.
I'his gives truth to Socrates' retort to Meno's stingray comparison. Socrates admits. "As
for myself. if the sting ray paralyzes others only through being paralyzed itself. then the
comparison isjust. but not otherwise" (80d). It is not the case that. knowing the answers
himself. Socrates goes out into the /\gora and perplexes others: rather. he is "infecting"
them with his own perplexity. Socrates famously ~t~lled that he is the wisest of men
because he knows that he does not know anything. In regards to the dialectic. taken at
race value. irthe process iSIO lirst "numb" the participants by ma kingthemreali/-etheir
own ignorance and then eventually lead them towards true knowledge then Socrates is
,\ "the high":SI poilll of my art is the po\\cr to prove by ..:v..:ry tcst \"hether th..: ollsprillg. of a ~ Olillg. man"s
Ihought is" falscph"nloll1orinstinctwilh lirc"nulnllh"(I:iOc)
lJS
successrul in the rormer but a railure in the lalter.~'1 Like the poet. Socrates' strength is his
abilitytodcfamiliarize.
However. this is only the case if we take Plato to be establishing some type or
doctrine. Rather. the issue or"Socratic ignorance" needs to be taken seriously. Socrates'
ignorance is an epistemic. moral. and pedagogical stance that ror him is the starting poil1l
ror inquiry (Gordon 121). That is not to suggest that Socrates is a nihilist and possesses
no commitments or his own: we sec his various convictions throughout the dialogues.
Ilowever. as we have seen. they are multifarious and ortentimes conlradictory. This is
part or Socratic ignorance. Given his stance. Socrates is always willing to revise his
bel ids when a better position reveals itself. As Simmias tells Socratcs in the P!li/l'I!o:
I think. just as you do. Socrates. that although it is very dirricult ir not impossible in
this lire to achieve certainty about these questions. at the same it is utterly feeble not to
use every errort in testing the available theories. or [0 leave otT before we have
considered them in every way. and come to the end or our resources. It is our duty to
do one of two things. either to ascertain the racts. whether by seeking instruction or by
personal discovery. or. ir this is impossible. to sdect the best and most dependable
theory which human il1lelligence can supply. and use it as a ract to ride the seas or lire
- thaI is. assuming that we canno[ make our journey with greater conridenee and
security by the surer means or divine revelation. (SSc)
I" In th~ ~ncl. Socrat~s ~onclud~s Ihat knOll kdg~ or virtu~ l11ust h~ distributed by "divin~ disp~nsalion:'
111l1lh) which is c1l1cidat~d inlh~ e/w('(/ms and SWI/)(I.'·;1I11/
II' beliefs. or theories. or ideas are the imperrect vessels by which we navigate the seas or
lire and experience. dialectic is the means by which we can test their seaworthiness.
Socratic ignorance rorces us to revise constantly our rafts and grants us the discretion as
to whether or we wish to abandon our current vessel ror a new. improved one. Socrates
dcfarniliarizes the individual. allowing him/her to sec thing anew rrom a dirrerent
perspective. expanding their critical gaze.
Shklovsky stales:
A poet removes all signs rrom their places. An artist always incites
insurrections among things.
Things arc always in a state or revolt with poets. casting otT their old
names and adopting new names and new races. A poet employs images as
rigures or speech by comparing them with each other. For instance. he
may call rire a red flower or he may attach a new epithet to an old word. or
else. like Bauddaire. he may say that a carcass lifts its legs likea woman
with lascivious intent. In this way he brings about a semantic shirt. He
wrests the concept rromthe semantic cluster in which it is embedded and
reassigns it with the help or the word (rigure or speech) to another
semantic cluster. We. the readers. sense the presence or something new.
the presence or an object in a new cluster. The new word envelops the
object. as new clothes envelop a man. The sign has been taken down. This
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is one of the ways in which an object can be transformed into something
felt. into something capable of becoming the material of and artistic work.
(Robinson 128)
Thus. according to Shklovksy. the poet disrupts the signifying function of concepts and
ideas. much like Socrates. Likewise. the poet. like the philosopher. does so not in order to
destroy that function. as the sophists do. but to transform it. to bring to it new life. The
poet wrenches an idea from its symbolic order not because slhe is dismissing the idea. or
even the possibility of a symbolic oreler. but to destabilize their relationship so Ihal Ihe
reader may explore new possibilities anelnew orders (Robinson 128).
Therefore. as oxymonJnic as it may sound. poetry thus compels us to move
beyond picture-thinking. Or. more appropriately. poetry uses imagery as an occasion for
thought. Poetry is more than the sensible experience of the image: it is about the ideas the
image can stimulate. More specifically. it challenges our preconceived notions about the
images' relCrent. Plato makes similar use orimagery. Indeed. the dialogues arc constantly
appealing to the visual senses. using images in order for the reader to grasp various ideas.
The cave. the line. and the chariot arc but a few examples. Plato inspires Ihe reader to
contemplate philosophical ideas by drawing from the mutable phenomena of sensible
experience. Even when moving beyond the sensible to discuss the forms. Plato still relics
on the reader's imagination to construct other worlds and images. as is the case wilh a
dialogue like the Till/(/I'II.1' (Gordon 137).
rhis makes sense if we take seriously Plato's point about the human soul in
P/wedrtls. II' we have feet in both camps of the sensible and the ideal, we must then
appeal to our sensible if we arc to make use of our limited nature. As Socrates states. to
speak of the form of the soul would be beyond our purview, however it is within our
means to describe it briefly by way of an image (P/wednrs 246a). Though an earthly
likenessisadim reminder of the ideal reality. it isaremindernonetheless. While we arc
embodied spirits. the only access we have to reality is by way or sensible images. Such is
our lot (Gordon 154). Therefore, learning is looking to images (Gordon 14R).
Let us return to the Line analogy. Socrates' explanation of the I.ine is in I~lcl
uneven. During his exposition of the visible. Socrates talks about their objects (physical.
sensual things). but not about the kind of thinking that corresponds to them. while in his
discussion of the intelligible. he explains the nature of the thinking that it represents. but
docs not say what their objects are. Asaresult.just asit is problematic to discuss what
sort of thinking constitutes eikasia and pis/is, so too is it problematic to determine what
kind of objects are intended bydi(//lOiaand I/oesis. Di(///Oia is especially troublesome
because if we can conclude that the objects or I/oesis are the Forms. then where docs that
Icave dial/oia'i It is tempting to asscrt that the objects or dial/oia arc images or thc Forms.
but that would mean physical objects. and dial/oia is purely rational. It is ortcn suggested
that the objcets of dil/l10 ia arc illlermediate mathematical Forms. but dial/oia is not
limited as such. Rather. it is more appropriate to suggest that any rorm or reasoning that
posits and draws consequcnccs rrom intelligible reality without inquiring into its
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foundation is d;lIl1o;a. Socrates uses countless other sources beyond mathematics to
facilitate thinking about illlelligible realities, most of which being physical things.
including the sun. the cave. the chariot. the ladder. pregnancy. and intercourse (Dorter
105-6). Practitioners of d;lIl1o;a usc physical models to illustrate their point. but the
mal tel' of thought is not the object ilself. rather it is lhe intelligible reality that the model
represellls. Socrates orten uses geometric examples. like the squares in J'V!l'I10. but
Socrates is not talking aboullhe particular example, he is trying to speak to the Form of
square (Dorter 192-3). Socrates slates:
For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and
such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures
and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of
science. regard them as known. and. treating them as absolute
assumptions. do not deign to render any further account of them to
themselves or olhers. taking it for grallled thaI they are obvious to
everybody. They take lheirstart from thel1l and pursuing the inquiry from
this poinl on consistenlly. conclude wilh that for the invesligalion of which
they set out 1 ... jThe ,'erythingswhich they l1loldanddrawn which hm'e
shadows and images of themselves in water. lhesethingstheytreat inlheir
turn as only images. bUI what they really seck is togel sight of those
realilies which can be seen only by the mind. (510c-e)
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Therelore. the nature of diwlOio is to usc visible images as a way of thinking about
intelligible objects (Republic 510b-d). One could thus argue lhatthe whole purpose of
Republic is that Plato is creating an image of a city in order to gel his readers thinking
about the ideaoflhe state. Repuhlic as a dialogue can be interpreted as an exercise in
dilil/oio.
This is similar to Shklovsky"s point about poetic imagery. When a poel wrests a
sign from its symbolic fielcl. s/he is trying to engage with the way the reader
conceptualizes the sign. In this way. philosophy and poetry arc akin insofar as thL:y create
images in order to inspire thought.
3.4 SUllInu\I'Y
WL: can take Shklovksy's points about deramiliarization as a rcsponse to Socrates'
challenge poetry in the Republic. Poetry docs indeed have a leclllle: it is the ability to
rL:nder objects or concepts unramiliar to the reader. as is seen with Tolstoy's treatment or
ownership. Moreover. we see that Socrates' point about poetry being two steps rrom
reality is incomplete because poetry is more than mimesis. In fact. based on our rL:ading
of the l\!Iel/o. we see that philosophy and pOelry have much in common. Like Shklo\'sky's
poet \\"ho del~1Il1iliarizL:s a reader. Socrates "numbs" an interlocutor. 130th contribute to
breaking an individual's habitual schemel. This break iscruciall()rit isthe lirststep
towards knowledge: it forces the individual to renlnsidL:r an idea. and contemplate
whether there are bellL:r ways of thinking. The dcfamiliari/.ing quality of poetry is
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lI!Joretic in that it cxposcs the individual to his/her ignorance, conscqucntly gencrating
that recling or wonder that inspires philosophical thought. lI'there is an "Ancient quarrel
between philosophy and poetry" it is a sibling rivalry, not a battle between t\\'o foes.
IO~
I onethcless. to retCr to the "ancient quarrel bctwccn philosophy and poetry' is 10
invite the comparison. Arguing that philosophy and poetry have similar goals. as this
paper suggests. raises the question of which is beller. However. the purpose of this thesis
was not to defend poetry against Socrates' claims: such has already been done by writers
such as Iris Murdoch in The Fire alld Ihe SIIII. Rather. our aim was to dissolve the
argument aillogethcr. Indeed. philosophy and poetry arc only quarrelsome when they arc
caricaturized in extremely polarized fashion. that is to say. when philosophy is perceived
merely as the dry, excessively rational pursuit of logos and poetry as the outpul of an
inspired mime.
As we have seen. both poetry and dialectic explore concepts by challenging the
individual's beliefs. In lOll and l?efillIJlic. Socrates dismisses poetry because it docs not
havcaleclllleand is lwosteps removed from reality because it is mimetic. Moreover.
Socrates goes on to claim that philosophy is superior because it can provide a logos and
he is not satisfied Wilh mere images. This is the Socrates that lietzsche so reviles in The
lJi,.,h ofTmgedr: the Socrates that is obsessed with reason and logos:
Beside this isolated insight. born of an excess or honesty if not of
exuberance. there is. to be sure. a proround illusion that first saw the light
or the world in the person of Socrales: the unshakable faith that thought.
using the thread of causality. can penetrate the deepest abyss 0 fbeing.lhat
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thought is capablc of not only knowing bcing but evcn of correctillg it.
(Nietzsche 95)
Furthermorc. thc dialogucs thcmselves subvert and undermine Socratcs' championing of
logos with the various uporetic endings and grumblings from thc intcrlocutors. 5o
Howevcr. Plwedms and SrJlll}(}silllll show that philosophy cannot. and should nol.
be rcduced to logos and discursivc reasoning. Both thc impctus and ,elos of philosophy
are in fact non-discursive. as thc discussions of eros and recollcction show. Plato takes
these considcrations into account by writing the dialogues such as hc does. The dialogues
are more staged productions than trcatises. Thc dialogucs show dialcctic more as a stance
towards experience than a list of predicates. Plato is drawing allcntion more towards the
wayin which Socrates approaches philosophical discussion than thc actual content of his
argumcnts. Cenainlythere are metaphysical convictions that are bcingexplored here. and
thcre arc many positions that are dismissed (e.g. sophistry). but the reader hardly comes
away with any son of cataloguc of definitions. Take PUrJllellides for example. If this werc
mcant to bc an cxposition on Parmenidcan philosophy then it is one of the worst ever
wrillen: at the end the reader has more questions Ihan answers. Instead. what Plato shows
us is away tobe sceptical without bcingsophistieand Illisologistic.lt is a conversion toa
Illodeoflifc.
'>°SdH)larshave suggeslcd that this mayrcprcsenl the;-.hift hetweenSocratl's:lnd Platu
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And this is what opens up the possibility for poetry to come onto the scene.
Because dialectic is bookended by non-discursive experiences, poetry can be of some
assistance. As Shklovsky explains, poetry is distinct from prosaic, or discursivc,
language. Poetry plays with the variability of signifiers to defamiliarize readers. and
challenge their beliefs and convictions. This is where poetry and dialectic overlap. as is
seen in the Mello with Socrates' "numbing." Dcl~lmiliarization is like the break that the
prisoner experiences at the first step out of the Cave. The reader. like the prisoner. has
taken a step beyond cik(/.I'i(/. and is now considering ideas and concepts. as opposed to
habitualizedpicture-thinking.
But instead of seeing this as a competition. we should be exploring the ways in
which they can work together. Using Platonic terminology. we can usc poetry as a
di(/lloclic device. The poetic treatment of objects or ideas moves us towards their
corresponding Forms. Tolstoy docs as much when he discusses ownership in
"Kholstomer..51 Furthermore. Socrates docs so in the numerous metaphors and analogies
he uses 10 explain his points. The Kallipolis is the perrcct example. The Kallipoli., is ;111
image constructed by Socrates to get his interlocutors thinking about justice and the sou!.
and eventually to draw some conclusions. This is how poetry and philosophy work
together. A reader can approach a work of literature dialectically. The poem inspires
various ideas and stimulates various beliefs. and the reader can then inturll explore these
'II Sl:cChaptcr.1, pagcX7
10)
experiences discursively. But because one can never exhaustively define any of the
Forms, the reader can return to a piece repeatedly. finding new paths to explore.
And such is the case with the dialogues. The dialogues are oftentimes bookended
by non-discursive, metaphoric imagery. Repllhlic, as we discussed in chapter one is a
perfect example. Not only docs Plato use various images throughout the dialogue. with
the Cave and the Line, but he also starts and finishes the dialogues with the two distinctly
juxtaposing images of a physical port. the Pireaus. and a spiritual port, the Myth of Er.
This is representative of the way in which the dialectic is also bookended by IlOIl-
discursive moments. as was explored in Chapter Two with PllIIedms and Srlliplisilllll.
Plato is thus showing us how these non-discursive moments can be supplemellt using
poctie images. As Nietzsche states. "Plato has given to all postcrity the model ofa new
art form. the model of the novel 1... 1 in which poctry holds the same rank in rclationto
dialectical philosophy as this same philosophy held of many centuries in relation to
theology: namely. the rallk of ullcil/u']" (91). The relationship bctwecn poctry and
philosophy canthercfore be a union. not a quarrel.
., Walt~r Kaufman. translator "f Th" lJirrh II/Tmg"dr. Iranslat~s (///('ilill as "11,,,,dll1aid"
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